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TO BAIL OR NOT TO BAIL: PROTECTING 
THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN 
NEVADA 
Nevada Law Journal Staff* 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
On August 2, 2018, then Governor Brian Sandoval announced a compre-
hensive review of Nevada’s criminal justice system.1 As part of this review, the 
Governor tasked the Advisory Committee on the Administration of Justice 
(ACAJ) with conducting a thorough evaluation of the state’s criminal justice 
system and the development of policy recommendations to be considered dur-
ing the 80th Session of the Nevada Legislature. In January, the ACAJ released 
their final report which revealed that the growth of the Nevada’s carceral state 
was driven by the increase in the number of people incarcerated for probation 
and parole violations.2 The AJAC report also stated that at least two-thirds of 
the incarcerated population entered the system with a sentence for a nonviolent 
offense.3 Moreover, the Committee included twenty-five strategic policy rec-
ommendations to “improve public safety by holding offenders accountable, re-
ducing recidivism, and increasing the resources available to combat the state’s 
behavioral health crisis” and control the growth of the incarcerated population 
and corrections costs.4 Noticeably absent from the ACAJ’s recommendations 
                                                        
*  This White Paper was written by Brendan McLeod, Forum Editor, and Ebeth R. Palafox, 
Nevada Law Editor, with contributions in drafting, editing, and researching by Rebecca 
Crooker, Jeffrey Chronister, Joshua Garry, Shaneka Malloyd, Sara Schreiber, and Shannon 
Zahm. The Nevada Law Journal would also like to thank Justice James W. Hardesty, Profes-
sors Anne Traum and Eve Hanan, and Assemblymen Steve Yeager and Ozzie Fumo for their 
support and contributions in topic selection and research.  
1  Mary-Sarah Kinner, Governor Sandoval Announces Initiative to Improve Outcomes in 
State’s Criminal Justice System (Aug. 2, 2018), 
http://gov.nv.gov/layouts/Page_Style_1.aspx?id=254900 [https://perma.cc/E8BP-QHNK]. 
2  Steve Yeager, Criminal Justice Reform Can Move Nevada Forward, RENO GAZETTE J. 
(Dec. 3, 2018, 2:36 PM), https://www.rgj.com/story/opinion/voices/2018/12/03/criminal-
justice-reform-can-move-nevada-forward-yeager/2197000002/ [https://perma.cc/JC7D-
WDJZ]. 
3  Id. 
4  NEV. ADVISORY COMM’N ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE, 
FINAL REPORT 1, 5 (Jan. 2019), 
3 NEV. L.J. FORUM 9 5/7/2019  10:51 AM 
10 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL FORUM [Vol. 3:9 
 
are policies regarding pretrial practices—specifically preventative detention 
and bail setting practices—despite these issues being at the center of criminal 
justice reform conversations in Nevada in the last five years.5  
In-state conversations surrounding preventative detention and bail setting 
practices mirror those occurring in other states across the country. The growing 
consensus across both sides of the aisle6 is that the cash bail system is broken 
because it has a disparate effect on indigent individuals and people of color and 
their access to justice.7 Most recently, California became the first state to “elim-
inate” its cash bail system. However, this move drew concerns from criminal 
justice reform advocates that it would do more harm than good.8 In particular, 
critics expressed concerns that the abolishment of the cash bail system would 
authorize expansive power for the courts and increase prosecutorial discretion, 
while continuing to have a disparate impact on the poor and people of color.9  
Our white paper aims to discuss the issues associated with bail reform, 
provide an analysis of bail reform efforts across the country, and purpose pos-
sible solutions for obstacles to bail reform in Nevada. The white paper’s pro-
posed recommendations for practical bail reform is a three phase plan to elimi-
nate the injustices that arises from Nevada’s current cash bail model.  
 
Phase One: Eliminate Bail Schedules in Nevada 
 
“Money bail may serve only one legitimate role: to incentivize someone to 
return to court as required.”10 Our current bail schedules do not allow for the 
consideration of an individual defendant’s circumstances.11 Bail schedules fail 
to consider what amount of money would actually incentivize the defendant to 
                                                                                                                                
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/InterimCommittee/REL/Document/13671 
[https://perma.cc/B9H7-XWXC] [hereinafter JRI FINAL REPORT]; Kinner, supra note 1. 
5  JAMES AUSTIN & ROBIN ALLEN, DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEVADA PRETRIAL RISK 
ASSESSMENT SYSTEM FINAL REPORT 1 (2016) available at 
https://nvcourts.gov/AOC/Templates/documents.aspx?folderID=19312 
[https://perma.cc/HRG6-PY4B]. See Assemb. B. 136, 2017 Leg., 79th Legis. Sess. (Nev. 
2017); Assemb. B. 17, 2019 Leg., 80th Legis. Sess. (Nev. 2019).  
6  Jessica Brand & Jessica Pishko, Bail Reform: Explained, APPEAL (June 14, 2018), 
https://theappeal.org/bail-reform-explained-4abb73dd2e8a/ [https://perma.cc/PZ52-7B23]. 
7  Id.  
8  See e.g., Jeremy B. White, California Ended Cash Bail. Why Are So Many Reformers Un-
happy About It?, POLITICO (Aug. 29, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/08/29/california-abolish-cash-bail-reformers-
unhappy-219618 [https://perma.cc/R39N-KLLE] (“The ACLU, NAACP and Human Rights 
Watch all abandoned their support for a move they initially hailed as a breakthrough for jus-
tice and fairness.”). 
9  Id. 
10  CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCH., MOVING BEYOND MONEY: A 
PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM 12 (2016), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/FINAL-Primer-on-
Bail-Reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/V87P-M64R] [hereinafter MOVING BEYOND MONEY]. 
11  Id. 
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return to court.12 An indigent individual may not be able to afford bail and is 
therefore constructively forced into pretrial detention.13 However, a wealthy 
individual may find that losing any money posted to bail is “inconsequential” 
and thus not an incentive to return to court.14 
Phase One would focus on the immediate elimination of bail schedules in 
Nevada. By eliminating bail schedules across the state, Nevada can bring to 
halt some of the systematic injustices prevalent in pretrial practices. The elimi-
nation of bail schedules will allow judges to focus on individuals before them, 
while still protecting the community and ensuring the defendant’s appearance 
in court. 
 
Phase Two: Implementation of an Algorithmic and Interview Risk assessment 
program 
 
Switching from a system based solely on instinct and experience (often re-
ferred to as “gut instinct”) to one in which judges have access to scientific, ob-
jective risk assessment tools could further the criminal justice system’s central 
goals of increasing public safety, reducing crime, and making the most effec-
tive, fair, and efficient use of public resources.15 These factors should include 
those similar to the Laura and John Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety As-
sessment (PSA).16  
The PSA is designed to predict risk in three areas: risk of failure to appear 
(FTA), risk of new criminal activity (NCA), and risk of new violent criminal 
activity (NVCA).17 This risk prediction can be based on an automatic system 
that draws on the following from court records: 1) age at current arrest; 2) cur-
rent violent offense; 3) pending charge at the time of the offense; 4) prior dis-
orderly persons conviction; 5) prior indictable convictions; 6) prior violent 
convictions; 7) prior failure to appear at a pre-disposition court date in the last 
two years; 8) prior failure to appear at a pre-disposition court date more than 
two years ago; and 9) prior sentence to incarceration.18 These factors correlate 
to each of the three areas with different weight to provide FTA, NCA, and 
NVCA scores.19 By using these scores, the PSA provides judges with a recom-
mendation about the conditions of release or detention according to the Deci-
                                                        
12  Id. 
13  Id. 
14  Id.  




SC4K] [hereinafter NEW JERSEY PRETRIAL JUSTICE MANUAL]. 
16  Id. at 7. 
17  Id. 
18  Id. at 8. 
19  Id. at 8–9. 
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sion Making Framework (DMF).20 The combination of these scores and the 
DMF provides judges with recommendations for the least restrictive means of 
pretrial release to ensure court appearance and public safety.21 
Phase Two would look to the implement an algorithmic based risk assess-
ment tool similar to that suggested by the Supreme Court of Nevada’s Commit-
tee to Study Evidence-Based Pretrial Release. However, Phase Two seeks to 
establish a more objective based pretrial practice by implementing the use of an 
evidence based pretrial risk assessment in conjunction with a pretrial options 
matrix. Further, this algorithmic risk assessment tool should be coupled with a 
personal interview process. By merging a scientifically-backed algorithmic sys-
tem with an interview-based model, pretrial services can create individualized 
pretrial plans that will account for a defendant’s risk to the community, ensure 
their appearance in court, and consider the burden pretrial conditions would 
place on a presumptively innocent defendant.  
 
Phase Three: Creation of a Pretrial Agency in Clark County to Coincide with 
the Elimination of Cash Bail 
 
Washington D.C. has established a dedicated agency within the Court Ser-
vices and Offender Supervision Agency called the Pretrial Services Agency 
(D.C.’s PSA).22 D.C.’s PSA assists the D.C. Superior Court by “formulating 
release recommendations and providing supervision and treatment services to 
defendants which reasonably assure that those on conditional release return to 
court and do not engage in criminal activity pending their trial and/or sentenc-
ing.”23 D.C.’s PSA operates under the assumption that reliance on money bail 
discriminates against the indigent and does not effectively address public con-
cerns with pretrial release.24 
Phase Three create pretrial agencies in counties with populations of over 
100,000 people to coincide with the elimination of cash bail. These agencies 
would be an alternative to the current system by implementing the risk factor 
assessment and interview steps from Phase Two, combined with emerging 
technologies to ensure adequate pretrial supervision.  
We believe that by following the examples of successful bail reform across 
the country and analyzing the failures in other jurisdictions, we can help our 
State’s dialogue on the most important issues in the bail reform forum. Our 
hope is that this paper will allow Nevada policy makers to understand the many 
facets of the bail reform issue, and to make better informed decisions. 
                                                        
20  Id. at 10. 
21  Id.  
22  PSA’s History, PRETRIAL SERVS. AGENCY FOR D.C., 
https://www.psa.gov/?q=about/history [https://perma.cc/25UV-MX2Z] (last visited May 3, 
2019) [hereinafter PSA’s History]. 
23  Id.  
24  Id. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, Leslie Turner was arrested in North Las Vegas, Nevada because 
she failed to pay for a traffic ticket.25 In the months prior, Ms. Turner struggled 
to keep her head above water. Her son was born two months premature, which 
resulted in after-birth complications, and was also diagnosed with Clonus, “a 
condition that results in involuntary muscle spasms sometimes caused by an 
underdeveloped nervous system.”26 Ms. Turner relied on the help of her mother 
and Clark County Social Services after the birth of her son so that she could 
continue to care for her son and maintain her monthly housing expenses.27 
However, her unpaid traffic tickets remained a problem during this difficult 
time.28 Nevada is one of thirteen states that treat traffic violations as criminal 
infractions.29 When she missed a payment, Ms. Turner called the court to ex-
plain her extenuating circumstances, but she was “told she would either have to 
attend court or turn herself in.”30 
Unfortunately for Ms. Turner, and other similarly situated Nevadans, state 
law “does not provide a grace period for individuals on payment plans, and 
people who miss a payment can be arrested,” despite an on-time payment histo-
ry.31 For example, the Las Vegas Township Justice Court website warns that it 
                                                        
25  Jenniffer Solis, Fines & Fees Sent Nursing Mother to Jail for Traffic Tickets, NEV. 
CURRENT (June 5, 2018), https://www.nevadacurrent.com/2018/06/05/system-of-fines-and-
fees-sent-nursing-mother-to-jail-for-traffic-tickets/ [https://perma.cc/ZCE2-9XX2]. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. 
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“will issue arrest warrants for all unpaid traffic tickets. An additional warrant 
fee of $150 and a late fee of $100 will be added to all tickets that proceed into 
warrant status.”32 As a result of this policy, a missed payment for a traffic ticket 
is recorded as a “failure to appear in court, rendering the person who got the 
ticket subject to a bench warrant and arrest.”33 Following her missed payment, 
Ms. Turner returned to work to make some money and get back on track with 
her payment plan.34 Soon after, Ms. Turner was pulled over, arrested, and in-
carcerated.35 Her bail was set at $1,500—an amount higher than what she made 
in a month.36 
Ms. Turner’s story highlights the collateral costs associated with Nevada’s 
cash bail system, the role of judicial discretion in bail setting practices, and ex-
poses how a given state’s bail system disproportionately affects marginalized 
communities such as the poor and people of color. The general purpose of bail 
“is to prevent people from evading their obligation to go to court and to protect 
potentially dangerous people from causing harm before their cases are decid-
ed.”37 However, “minor offenses like the failure to pay parking tickets” often 
results in incarceration at taxpayer expense.38 Under Nevada law, “[b]ail should 
not be more than the accused can reasonably be expected to pay under their cir-
cumstances . . . , but many judges still impose high bail on those who cannot 
afford it.”39 Arguably, an “unreasonably high bail is ‘tantamount to no bail at 
all.’ ”40 The inability to pay bail and the resulting lengthy time in jail perpetu-
ates the country’s mass incarceration problem, a political hot button topic in 
recent years, though it started decades ago.41 Particular concerns are tied to the 
country’s growing jail population which has tripled over the last three dec-
ades.42 Interestingly, the United States incarcerates more people before trial 
                                                        
32  Avoid a Warrant for Your Arrest Being Issued, Pay the Fine Or …, LAS VEGAS JUST. CT., 
http://www.lasvegasjusticecourt.us/divisions/traffic_-_citation/pay_the_fine_or.php 
[https://perma.cc/M5XT-RCXD] (last visited Mar. 3, 2019). 
33  Solis, supra note 25. 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. 
40  Id. (quoting Nevada Assemblyman Osvaldo Fumo).  
41  “The term ‘mass incarceration’ refers to the unique way the [United States] lock[s] up a 
vast population in federal and state prisons, as well as local jails.” What is Mass Incarcera-
tion?, DANNOTT.COM (May 25, 2016), https://dannott.com/2016/05/25/what-is-mass-
incarceration/ [https://perma.cc/N3VN-4EGV]; see discussion infra Section I. 
42  Joshua Aiken, Era of Mass Expansion: Why State Officials Should Fight Jail Growth, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 31, 2017), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/jailsovertime.html [https://perma.cc/KR5J-8MV8]. 
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than most countries have in its prisons and jails combined.43 Additionally, more 
than half a million unconvicted and presumably innocent individuals behind 
bars remain in jail during the pretrial detention process because they cannot af-
ford to pay bail.44 Reforms to cash bail systems in states across the country, 
Nevada included, would begin to undo mass incarceration by targeting a major 
cause of overpopulated jails in cities, towns, and municipalities across the 
country, and reverse the disparities created by the system. 
To this end, this White Paper seeks to address the aforementioned con-
cerns. Part I details mass incarceration in the United States. It begins with its 
origin, the expansion, and links the role of pretrial detention in mass incarcera-
tion. Part II provides an overview of the cash bail system and reform attempts. 
Part III is an analysis and critique of county and municipal tools used to set 
bail, such as bail schedules and pretrial risk assessments. Part IV outlines Ne-
vada’s cash bail system and examines current bail reform endeavors in the 
state. Part V of this White Paper concludes with recommendations to address 
issues with bail, pretrial detention, and mass incarceration in Nevada. This pro-
posal provides the opportunity for reform in three phases: Phase One eliminates 
bail schedules and encourages inter-judiciary cooperation; Phase Two works to 
eliminate bias in pretrial risk assessments; and Phase Three proposes creating a 
pretrial agency in counties with higher populations as cash bail is eliminated in 
those areas. 
I. MASS INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES  
“The United States is home to 5 percent of the world’s population, but 25 per-
cent of the world’s prisoners. Think about that. Our incarceration rate is four 
times higher than China’s. We keep more people behind bars than the top 35 
European countries combined.”45 
In his remarks at the 2015 NAACP Conference, former President Barack 
Obama stressed a devastating truth.46 Nearly half a decade later, the United 
States continues to lead the world in rates of incarceration, though our history 
reveals that was not always the case.47 In 1972, the United States’ incarcerated 
                                                        
43  Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018.html 
[https://perma.cc/5ZYG-ZPEP].  
44  Stephanie Wykstra, Bail Reform, Which Could Save Millions of Unconvicted People from 
Jail, Explained, VOX.COM (Oct. 17, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/future-
perfect/2018/10/17/17955306/bail-reform-criminal-justice-inequality 
[https://perma.cc/S6GS-HCEJ]. 
45  President Barack Obama, Address at the NAACP Conference (July 14, 2015), available 
at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/14/remarks-president-
naacp-conference [https://perma.cc/4S97-T6MS]. 
46  Id. 
47  See JUSTICE POLICY INST., THE PUNISHING DECADE: PRISON AND JAIL ESTIMATES AT THE 
MILLENNIUM (May 2000), 
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population was 300,00048; approximately fifty years later, the population has 
risen to 2.3 million people behind bars.49 The sudden rise of the country’s in-
carcerated population has pushed the criminal justice system to a “tipping 
point,” particularly in light of the effect such an immense carceral state has on 
civil rights.50 For example, criminal justice reform advocates argue that the 
“runaway use of incarceration dehumanizes poor people and people of color, 
damages already marginalized communities, does not advance public safety, 
and siphons public resources with no social benefit.”51 So, what is to blame for 
the sevenfold increase of the country’s incarcerated population?  
Our country’s history plays a crucial role in understanding mass incarcera-
tion. At its core, this crisis is a product of decades of choices from various lev-
els of political power.52 Starting in the mid-1960s, the punitive transformation 
of urban policy implemented by Republicans and Democrats alike, led to the 
significant expansion of the carceral state over various administrations.53 In 
March 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson declared the federal government’s 
War on Crime by signing the Law Enforcement Assistance Act—the first na-
tional investment in local control efforts, essentially authorizing the federal 
government a direct role in the militarization of local police.54 Later, President 
Richard Nixon enacted his own punitive policy by declaring a war on drugs, 
which pushed welfare programs to the wayside to invest in policing and pun-
ishment.55 Due to the 126% increase in violent crime rates between 1960 and 
1970, and anticipating a continued rise in crime, policymakers urged states to 
                                                                                                                                
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/punishing_decade.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9VGY-6E8E]. 
48  13TH (Kandoo Films, Forward Movement 2016). 
49  Wagner & Sawyer, supra note 43.  
From the mid-1970s to the mid-’80s, America’s incarceration rate doubled, from about 150 peo-
ple per 100,000 to about 300 per 100,000. From the mid-’80s to the mid-’90s, it doubled again. 
By 2007, it had reached a historic high of 767 people per 100,000, before registering a modest 
decline to 707 people per 100,000 in 2012.  
Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Black Family in the Age of Mass Incarceration, ATLANTIC (Oct. 
2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/10/the-black-family-in-the-age-
of-mass-incarceration/403246/ [https://perma.cc/NUE3-3RZC]. 
50  Ending Mass Incarceration, VERA INST. JUST., https://www.vera.org/ending-mass-
incarceration [https://perma.cc/B999-XFHP] (last visited Mar. 3, 2019). 
51  Id. 
52  See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, THE GROWTH OF 
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (Jeremy 
Travis et al. eds., 2014), https://johnjay.jjay.cuny.edu/nrc/NAS_report_on_incarceration.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9SJJ-2XNQ] [hereinafter GROWTH OF INCARCERATION]. 
53  See id. at 70–130. 
54  Id. at 110–11. 
55  James Cullen, The History of Mass Incarceration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jul. 20, 
2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/history-mass-incarceration 
[https://perma.cc/E3M5-83EK]. 
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build new correctional facilities.56 In the late 1970s, President Jimmy Carter, 
“who campaigned on a promise of equality and opportunity . . . crafted an ur-
ban policy that was essentially punitive and discriminatory.”57 Under his ad-
ministration, housing projects transformed into zones with increased and con-
stant surveillance, as well as increased police presence.58 By the 1980s, crime 
control and incarceration dominated the nation’s response to poverty and ine-
quality, a response driven by bad data collection and bad social science.59 From 
1984 to 1998, the country experienced a decline in crime, but with continuously 
higher incarceration rates.60 Specifically, 
states with the largest increases in incarceration experienced, on average, small-
er declines in crime than other states. The “above average” states increased their 
rate of incarceration by an average of 72% and experienced a 13% decline in 
crime, while the rate of incarceration in “below average” states rose by 30% and 
crime rates declined by 17%.61 
According to the Sentencing Project, the increase in the use of incarcera-
tion during this time, and in the decades after, is a result of policies like harsher 
drug laws and sentencing policies, rather than an increase in crime rates.62 
Decades of punitive and discriminatory policies have resulted in a system 
that criminalizes the poor and disproportionately affects communities of color. 
                                                        
56  See Lauren-Brooke “L.B.” Eisen & Oliver Roeder, America’s Faulty Perception of Crime 
Rates, BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/americas-
faulty-perception-crime-rates [https://perma.cc/R4UD-WR3H]. 
57  Imani Perry, ‘From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime,’ by Elizabeth Hinton, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/29/books/review/from-the-war-
on-poverty-to-the-war-on-crime-by-elizabeth-hinton.html [https://perma.cc/2SBC-EVYW]. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. Data reveals that the “relationship between crime and incarceration is more discordant 
that it appears.” Coates, supra note 49. For example, despite the increase in violent crime 
rates between 1960 and 1970, incarceration actually rates fell. Id.; see also Eisen & Roeder, 
supra note 56. Moreover, in the following decade, both the incarceration rate and violent 
crime increased. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 47. The National Research Council 
found that when jurisdictions across the United States enacted these highly punitive policies 
and laws, they simultaneously turned away from rehabilitation and reintegration, and failed 
to reduce crime. GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 52, at 128–29. However, even once 
crime rates began to drop below the 1970s high, incarceration rates remained high. See Oli-
ver Yates Libaw, Incarceration Rate, Crime Drop Link Disputed, ABCNEWS, 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=95580&page=1 [https://perma.cc/SQ6W-7TQG] (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2019). One study found that despite a 13 percent reduction in crime between 
1991 and 1998, the prison population increased by 72 percent. Id. “The lack of correlation 
bolstered the claim that there is no strong relationship between imprisonment and crime.” Id. 
These strong measure policies of harsher punishments on crime show that increased incar-
ceration rates are an inefficient method of crime prevention. See GROWTH OF 
INCARCERATION, supra note 52, at 155–56. 
60  JENNI GAINSBOROUGH & MARC MAUER, DIMINISHING RETURNS: CRIME AND 
INCARCERATION IN THE 1990S 4 (Sept. 2000), 
https://static.prisonpolicy.org/scans/sp/DimRet.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4BE-9UZR]. 
61  Id. 
62  See id. at 17. 
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According to the Prison Policy Initiative, communities of color, specifically the 
Black community, are overrepresented in the country’s incarcerated popula-
tion.63 Moreover, the majority of those in prison are poor, the poorest popula-
tions being women and people of color.64 
A. The Role of Women in Mass Incarceration 
Communities of color are not the only major group in the United States ad-
versely affected by incarceration policies. The criminal justice system has had a 
profound and unique effect on women; yet, women are noticeably absent from 
the larger conversation.65 Although women make up the minority of the incar-
cerated population, the rate of incarceration for women has grown at an “alarm-
ing speed.”66 In the last few decades, the number of women imprisoned overall 
increased at twice the rate of growth for men.67 Additionally, states have expe-
rienced concerning growth in the rate of incarceration for women.68 Nevada, 
for example, where despite women comprising less than ten percent of the in-
mate population, the state’s female prison population “has grown at four times 
the pace of the overall prison population.”69 This growth is evidence of a 39% 
increase in the last decade—an imprisonment rate 43% higher than the national 
average, per capita.70 Further, the rate of imprisonment for women of color is 
striking when compared to white women.71 In 2018, more than 200,000 women 
were incarcerated, with nearly 25% of them sitting in jails without a conviction, 
awaiting trial, or because they could not afford to pay bail.72  
                                                        
63  Wagner & Sawyer, supra note 43; THE SENTENCING PROJECT, TRENDS IN U.S. 
CORRECTIONS 5 (2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf [https://perma.cc/D39D-F6ZB] 
[hereinafter TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS]. 
64  Wagner & Sawyer, supra note 43. 
65  Kelsey Antle, Women and Mass Incarceration, BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (Apr. 29, 2016), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/women-and-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/3PTZ-
8FX5]. 
66  Id. 
67  TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS, supra note 63, at 4. 
68  See generally Wendy Sawyer, The Gender Divide: Tracking Women’s State Prison 
Growth, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 9, 2018), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/women_overtime.html [https://perma.cc/4PJT-KJLQ]. 
69  JRI FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 4; KNPR News Staff, Report: Nevada Prison Popula-
tion Above Average and Growing, NEV. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 13, 2018), 
https://knpr.org/headline/2018-09/report-nevada-prison-population-above-average-and-
growing [https://perma.cc/M54T-HWGF]. 
70  KNPR News Staff, supra note 69. 
71  Compare 49 per every 100,000 white women with ninety-six and sixty-seven per every 
100,000 black and Latina women, respectively. TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS, supra note 63, 
at 5. Note that the lifetime likelihood of imprisonment of U.S. residents born in 2001 is 1 in 
18 and 1 in 45 for black and Latina women, respectively (as compared to the 1 in 111 for 
white women). Id. 
72  Jessicah Pierre, Mass Incarceration is a Women’s Issue, Too, INST. POL’Y STUDIES (Nov. 
1, 2017), https://ips-dc.org/mass-incarceration-womens-issue/ [https://perma.cc/N2DQ-
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The issue is not simply the shocking increase in incarceration rates of 
women; the impact of incarceration reaches far beyond the inmate to their fami-
lies. Currently, more than 120,000 mothers are confined in institutions across 
the country.73 Over almost two decades, from 1991 to 2007, “the number of 
children under age 18 with a mother in prison more than doubled . . . up 131 
percent” whereas “the number of children with a father in prison has only 
grown by 77 percent in this time period.”74 Like the overall rates of incarcera-
tion, the impacts are particularly apparent for communities of color such that 
“[1] in 9 African American children (11.4 percent), 1 in 28 Hispanic children 
(3.5 percent) and 1 in 57 white children (1.8 percent) have an incarcerated par-
ent.”75 Thus, “children are particularly susceptible to the domino effect of bur-
dens placed on incarcerated women.”76 
B. The Role of Pretrial Detention in Mass Incarceration 
By the same token, local jails found in mostly every city and town in the 
United States—the “front door” of incarceration—receive only a fraction of the 
larger discussion about criminal justice despite the significant role jails play in 
mass incarceration.77 According to the Prison Policy Initiative, “99% of the 
growth in jails over the last 15 years has been a result of increases in the pre-
trial population.”78 As of early 2019, more than 462,000, 76% of the country’s 
total jail population, are behind bars but have not been convicted of a crime.79 
The increase is not a result of heavy criminalization or increased violence, but 
                                                                                                                                
ZC4P]; New Report, Women’s Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018, Reveals How Many 
Women Are Locked up in the U.S., Where, and Why, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Nov. 13, 
2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2018/11/13/mass-incarceration-women-2018/ 
[https://perma.cc/V73L-D9Z9] [hereinafter Women’s Mass Incarceration]. 
73  Antle, supra note 65. “80% of women in jail are mothers, and most are the primary care-
takers of their children.” Women’s Mass Incarceration, supra note 72.  
74  Antle, supra note 65.  
75  THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON ECONOMIC 
MOBILITY 4 (2010), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2010/collateralcosts1pdf
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WVW-QJ37].  
76  Aleks Kajstura, Women’s Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2018, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2018women.html 
[https://perma.cc/84NR-CTLU].  
77  Wagner & Sawyer, supra note 43.  
78  Peter Wagner, Jails Matter. But Who is Listening, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Aug. 14, 
2015), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/08/14/jailsmatter/ [https://perma.cc/C3HB-
HWVF]; Wagner & Sawyer, supra note 43. 
79  Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON POL’Y 
INSTITUTE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html 
[https://perma.cc/R6HT-L8YL] [hereinafter Whole Pie 2019].  
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rather from “discretionary criminal justice policies that increasingly condition[] 
release from jail on whether they could pay for bail.”80 
Most recently, the mass incarceration epidemic is more and more a result 
of pretrial detention practices, which are “fueled by cash bail.”81 Only two 
countries in the world—the United States and the Philippines—have cash bail 
systems controlled by commercial bail bondsmen that require a defendant to 
pay money to be released during the pendency of their case.82 Our country’s 
cash bail system exists at the state level, thus many processes and guidelines for 
pretrial detention and release exist.83 While preventative detention and bail are 
critical parts of the criminal justice system, they adversely impact an accused 
person’s life, particularly communities of color and indigent defendants.84 For 
example, in some jurisdictions, “less than 10 percent of defendants can pay bail 
of less than $1,000.”85 Currently, the median bail is $10,000; median annual 
pre-incarceration incomes for people ages 23 to 39 reveal why, for some, re-
lease is not a possibility.86  
Moreover, the impact on minorities is such that “41.6 percent of black de-
fendants are detained pretrial while only 34.3 percent of white defendants 
are.”87 Additionally, “even when charged for the same crimes, black and His-
panic defendants often pay higher bail amounts than white defendants.”88 How-
ever, these issues are not newly discovered; decades of research and writing 
                                                        
80  Marc Levin & Ed Chung, Criminal Justice Reform Starts Before the Trial and Sentence, 
THEHILL (July 7, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/340931-
criminal-justice-reform-starts-before-the-trial-and-sentence [https://perma.cc/Q98N-ATP9].  
81  Emmeline Clein, Here’s How to Help End Cash Bail, THE NATION (Oct. 25, 2018), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/heres-how-to-help-end-cash-bail/ 
[https://perma.cc/XN3U-KRTB]. 
82  See Louis Jacobson, Are U.S., Philippines the Only Two Countries with Money Bail?, 
POLITIFACT CAL. (Oct. 9, 2018, 4:26 PM), 
https://www.politifact.com/california/statements/2018/oct/09/gavin-newsom/are-us-
philippines-only-two-countries-money-bail/ [https://perma.cc/TU6M-QQK2]. A system con-
trolled by commercial bail bondsmen is outlawed in all other countries. Adam Liptak, Illegal 
Globally, Bail for Profit Remains in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/29/us/29bail.html [https://perma.cc/289K-VZPX]. 
83  National consistency regarding bail does not exist. See generally SHIMA BARADARAN 
BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL IN AMERICA'S CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM (2018).  
84  See Note, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment: The Cautionary Tale of Federal Sentencing, 
131 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1125 (2018); Liana M. Goff, Note, Pricing Justice: The Wasteful 
Enterprise of America's Bail System, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 881, 881–84 (2017). 
85  BAUGHMAN, supra note 83, at 2.  
86  Whole Pie 2019, supra note 79.  
87  BAUGHMAN, supra note 83, at 9. 
88  Id.  
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have highlighted them.89 Yet, legislatures have made minimal strides in intro-
ducing meaningful legislation and reform.90  
Attached to this aspect of the criminal justice system are significant collat-
eral costs. For example, a defendant detained awaiting trial is more likely to be 
convicted if they go to trial.91 Similarly, a defendant is more likely to take a 
plea deal if they are denied bail or unable to make bail, and is also three times 
more likely to receive prison time than a similarly situated individual who was 
released.92 While a defendant is detained, they often lack access to their attor-
ney because of the constraints on the attorney to discuss the various issues in 
their case.93 Additionally, a defendant who remains detained will likely lose his 
or her job and housing.94 Societal effects include an economic loss because a 
person can no longer contribute, in addition to the accrued tax expense to keep 
people behind bars during the pendency of their case.95 
Among the many factors contributing to mass incarceration, the issue of 
pretrial detention and release has been a focus among those seeking criminal 
justice reform.96 Jails were intended to house those who are a danger to society 
or are a flight risk, but have instead “become massive warehouses primarily for 
those too poor to post even low bail [and] too sick.”97 In the United States, ap-
proximately three-quarters of a million people are sitting in a municipal or 
county jail waiting for their case to progress.98 Roughly 60% of the nationwide 
jail population consists of individuals who have yet to be a convicted of a 
crime, thus are presumed innocent.99 As discussed above, the burden of incar-
ceration does not affect everyone the same as evidenced by the disparate impact 
on low-income communities and communities of color.100 Advocates and legis-
                                                        
89  Goff, supra note 84, at 883. 
90  Currently, four states outlaw a cash bail system: Illinois, Kentucky, Oregon, and Wiscon-
sin. Moreover, New Jersey and Alaska very rarely permit money bail. Liptak, supra note 82.  
91  BAUGHMAN, supra note 83, at 5. 
92  Id. at 5–6.   
93  Id. at 7. 
94  See Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 420 (2016); Nick Pin-
to, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 13, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html [https://perma.cc/UN4S-
XBXN]. 
95  Wiseman, supra note 94.  
96  See PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., WHAT’S HAPPENING IN PRETRIAL JUSTICE 1 (Apr. 2019), 
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Document
FileKey=8f6f4242-48c6-def6-5e86-720d6c788efe&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/U5QW-
YATJ] [hereinafter WHAT’S HAPPENING IN PRETRIAL JUSTICE].  
97  VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 




98  See Pinto, supra note 94.  
99  Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2017). 
100  Id. at 1401–02.  
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lators across the country and the aisle101 are pushing to eliminate or reduce the 
reliance on money bail in their states and local jurisdictions in response to re-
ports and research on the shortcomings of pretrial detention systems.102 
 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CASH BAIL AND REFORM EFFORTS ACROSS THE 
COUNTRY 
With its roots in medieval England, the bail system used in the United 
States has become an integral part of the criminal justice system.103 “Bail is the 
temporary release of a person awaiting trial for a crime.”104 During the creation 
of the bail system, the main concern was whether a person released would re-
turn for future court dates.105 Accordingly, the purpose of bail was to strike the 
balance of a defendant’s interest in pretrial liberty and the society’s interest in 
ensuring the defendant shows up to future court appearances,106 in addition to 
the preservation of the presumption of innocence.107 During this time, all but 
the most serious offenders, were likely granted some type of bail.108 Like the 
Eighth Amendment, the English Bill of Rights prohibited excessive bail.109 The 
United States incorporated the English approach in its own bail system. In the 
summer of 1789, the first U.S. Congress passed the Judiciary Act, which grant-
ed bail to defendants in non-capital federal criminal cases.110 States, such as 
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, followed the federal government’s lead and 
established their own bail systems for criminal defendants.111 As a result, mon-
etary bail became the primary means of assuring the presence of the defendant 
at trial.112 
                                                        
101  Brand & Pishko, supra note 6. 
102  Gloria Gong, Could Pay for Success Help Make Bail Reform a Reality?, 
GOVERNING.COM (June 12, 2018, 3:00 AM), http://www.governing.com/blogs/bfc/col-bail-
pretrial-detention-reform-pay-for-success.html [https://perma.cc/LL8G-AL9B].  
103  R. Lamont Kaiser, The Bail System: Is It Acceptable?, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1006 
(1968); Pinto, supra note 94 (noting that “[b]y encouraging poor defendants to plead guilty, 
bail keeps the system afloat”). 
104  BAUGHMAN, supra note 83, at 1.  
105  Kaiser, supra note 103, at 1008. 
106  Donald B. Verrilli Jr., Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: Historical 
Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 329–30 (1982). 
107  Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (“Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, 
the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its mean-
ing.”); Yang, supra note 99, at 1411.  
108  TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE ET AL., PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE HISTORY OF BAIL AND 
PRETRIAL RELEASE 1–2 (2010). 
109  Kaiser, supra note 103, at 1007. 
110  SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 108, at 5. 
111  Id. at 4–5. 
112  Kaiser, supra note 103, at 1007.  
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In the 1960s, critics of the bail system began to share their concerns about 
the country’s bail system.113 These concerns included “whether the discretion-
ary application of bail was equitable and whether pre-trial detention adversely 
affected criminal defendants, particularly those who were too poor to pay.”114 
In 1966, the Federal Bail Reform Act—the first major reform to the Judiciary 
Act of 1789—was passed.115 Generally, this Act stated that non-capital defend-
ants should be released on their own recognizance or on “personal bonds” un-
less the judge decided those measures would not assure the defendant’s pres-
ence for trial.116 Moreover, the Act permitted judges to consider other factors to 
determine a defendant’s flight risk, such as public safety and the defendant’s 
criminal record.117 Soon after, various states passed similar legislation.118  
In 1970, Congress passed the District of Columbia Crime Bill, which per-
mitted the detention of defendants if they were assessed as a risk to the com-
munity.119 Nearly fifteen years later, Congress adopted the 1984 Bail Reform 
Act, which adopted similar provisions as the District of Columbia Crime 
Bill.120 This Act’s constitutionality was challenged in United States v. Saler-
no.121 In Salerno, the Court found that pre-trial detention based on a defend-
ant’s risk to the community was constitutional and did not violate his or her 
Due Process rights.122 The Court balanced the “government’s interest in pre-
venting crime by arrestees” and a defendant’s right to liberty in making its de-
cision.123 The Court concluded that the government’s interest was legitimate 
and compelling, while the defendant’s right to liberty “may, in circumstances 
where the government’s interest is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the 
greater needs of society.”124 As a result of the Salerno decision, the risk to the 
community became a prominent factor in determining whether to release a de-
fendant in the federal and state bail system. By 1999, almost every state enact-
ed a statute or established case law regarding pretrial supervised release.125  
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution is another im-
portant part of the country’s history of cash bail, which states: “Excessive bail 
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual pun-
                                                        
113  Yang, supra note 99, at 1411. 
114  Id. 
115  SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 108, at 12. 
116  Id. 
117  Yang, supra note 99, at 1413. 
118  SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 108, at 12. 
119  See District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91-358, § 23-1322(a)(1), 84 Stat. 473, 644 (1970). 
120  See Yang, supra note 99, at 1415. 
121  See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
122  Id. at 748. 
123  Id. at 749. 
124  Id. at 750–51. 
125  SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 108, at 12. 
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ishments inflicted.”126 Despite the system’s long history, what constitutes “ex-
cessive” bail has yet to be determined, specifically because the Supreme Court 
addressed the issue only a handful of times.127 For example, in Stack v. Boyle, 
the Court stated: “Bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calcu-
lated to fulfill this purpose is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.”128 
However, the Court never stated whether the defendant’s financial ability 
should be considered when setting monetary bail. The financial ability of de-
fendants has been a particularly important part of the conversation surrounding 
bail reform. Furthermore, whether a defendant has a right to bail is another is-
sue surrounding the Eighth Amendment. Only months after it decided Stack, 
the Supreme Court held that a right to bail is a fundamental, not absolute.129 
Because bail can be denied to a class of defendants, such as those convicted of 
capital murder, bail is not an affirmative right.130 Whether the Eighth Amend-
ment permits preventive detention is still up for debate. There is such little case 
law regarding the application of the Eighth Amendment in the realm of bail, 
and in most cases, the Fourteenth Amendment becomes the best tool to chal-
lenge a bail system. 
While the implementation of bail varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, 
most states follow what is known as the classic bail system.131In the classic bail 
system, the primary goals are to keep the public safe, ensure individuals appear 
in court, and respect a defendant’s presumption of innocence.132 Generally, the 
process starts following an arrest, when the individual goes before a judge. The 
judge then determines whether the defendant will be released before the resolu-
tion of the case, released subject to a condition or conditions, or held in for the 
pretrial process.133 Any determination to hold the defendant must be based on 
significant flight risk or the danger of the defendant being a danger to the 
community.134 If the judge determines that the defendant is not a flight risk or 
danger to the community, the judge has several options for how to release the 
defendant.135 For example, the judge can release the defendant on their own re-
cognizance (a personal promise that the defendant will return for their court ap-
pearance), conditional release, or release on a bond.136 A defendant released on 
conditional release may be required to fulfill certain requirements to maintain 
                                                        
126  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added). 
127  See e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1951). 
128  Id. at 5. 
129  Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545–46 (1952). 
130  Verrilli, supra note 106, at 331. 
131  See id. at 330–31.  
132  Id. at 335. Charles Doyle, Bail: An Overview of Federal Criminal Law, CONG. RES. 
SERV. 11 (July 31, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40221.pdf [https://perma.cc/XEW5-
YT83].  
133  MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 10, at 5.  
134  Id.  
135  Id. 
136  Id.  
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their freedom.137 These requirements may include checking in with pretrial su-
pervision, drug testing, electronic monitoring, or other conditions established 
by the court.138 
A defendant may receive one of two types of bonds: secured or unsecured. 
A secured bond is an amount of money a defendant can pay to secure their re-
lease.139 Whereas, an unsecured bond is the amount of money a defendant will 
have to pay if they fail to appear in court.140 Cash bail therefore is the amount 
of money a defendant pays as a condition of their release.141 Various methods 
are used to set bail regardless of the defendant’s ability to pay, such as a bail 
schedule, pretrial algorithms, or judicial discretion.142 When a defendant cannot 
afford to pay their bail, they may secure the money from a bail bondsmen for a 
non-refundable fee and often some kind of collateral.143  
A significant factor affecting an indigent defendant and their potential 
freedom is the current bail bonds industry. The percentage of defendants re-
leased on a bail bond increased from 24% to 42% between 1994 and 2004.144 
While bail bonds can create a “safety valve” on pretrial detention for those who 
cannot afford a full bond amount, it can also take pretrial decisions out of the 
hands of the court and put them into the hands of private companies.145 Current 
bond practices create a paradoxical effect for defendants the court might deem 
low risk for failure to appear. Many bail bond companies will not take low 
money bail bonds because it is less lucrative than high value ones.146 Accord-
ingly, defendants the court deems less likely to miss court are more likely to be 
in pretrial detention.147 
The variations in types of bond and within bail setting practices allow for 
institutional inequities to create unequal and unjust disparities between defend-
ants based on their race and socioeconomic background. With many jurisdic-
tions realizing the institutional inequities in their current bail systems, policy 
makers at the federal, state, and local level have focused on various methods of 
reform to ensure that the constitutional right of reasonable bail is available to 
all, regardless of wealth or race.148 These efforts to change inadequate pretrial 
practices are as varied as the jurisdictions themselves, which can range from 
                                                        
137  Id. at 5–6. 
138  Id. at 17–18. 
139  Id. at 6. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. 
142  Id. at 11–14. 
143  Id. at 12. 
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145  Id.  
146  Id. at 12–13. 
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the most extreme, such as amending State Constitutions and localized efforts to 
change practices within existing legal structures.149 
A. A Brief History of National Attempts at Bail Reform 
“Usually only one factor determines whether a defendant stays in jail before he 
comes to trial. That factor is not guilt or innocence. It is not the nature of the 
crime. It is not the character of the defendant. The factor is simply money. How 
much money does the defendant have?”150 
This sentiment stated by Robert F. Kennedy in 1964 was a concern echoed 
by many and became the center for three comprehensive waves of bail reform 
at the federal level: (1) the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966; (2) the Bail Re-
form Act of 1984; and (3) the wave of reform in the new millennium.151 The 
first two waves established tighter standards and barriers to bail by creating de-
nial of bail based on potential flight risk and reasonably assuring public safety, 
while the third wave has sought to balance what many perceive to be an over 
emphasis on pretrial detention. 
Arguments for bail reform in the 1960s were similar to arguments present-
ly being made for reform. The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 was based on 
two premises: (1) a person’s ability to pay should not determine if they are 
jailed; and (2) the danger of non-appearance should be the only consideration 
when bail is assessed.152 However, implementation of this Act coincided with 
rising crime rates in America.153 This trend prompted advocates to call for the 
creation of barriers to pretrial release for those who were a potential flight 
risk.154 The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 thus created a climate where the 
courts could hold a suspected criminal without bail based on whether they were 
a flight risk.155  
The rising crime rates of the late 1960’s lead to the “tough on crime” polit-
ical culture shift of the 1970’s, which led to the normalization of pretrial deten-
tion, whether the defendant’s charged crime was a capital offense or not.156 Us-
ing the basis of defendants who might be a “danger to the community,” almost 
                                                        
149  WHAT’S HAPPENING IN PRETRIAL JUSTICE, supra note 96, at 1.  
150  JOHN-MICHAEL SEIBLER & JASON SNEAD, THE HISTORY OF CASH BAIL 5 (Aug. 25, 2017), 
https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-08/LM-213.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LDP-
AJTU]. 
151  Id. at 5–8.  
152  Warren L. Miller, The Bail Reform Act of 1966: Need for Reform in 1969, 19 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 24, 24 (1970).  
153  Id. at 37, n.90. 
154  Id. at 48–49.  
155  AMANDA ZANIEWSKI, MASS. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE, 2 (Nov. 2014), 
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all states tightened their pretrial release standards by 1980.157 With individual 
states leading the charge in creating a “danger to the community” standard, the 
federal government soon followed suit. In 1984, Congress passed the Federal 
Bail Reform Act of 1984 which enabled judges to detain defendants to “reason-
ably assure” public safety.158 The United States Supreme Court found the Act 
to be constitutionally sound because it afforded defendants a full hearing and 
the Act was regulatory in nature.159 With standards for pretrial detention based 
around a defendant’s flight risk and risk to the community, some felt that bail 
became a burden on the presumptively innocent, poor defendant.160 
The United States is now experiencing a third wave of bail reform focused 
on facilitating more conducive conditions for pretrial release in hopes of 
fighting mass incarceration.161 While the growing carceral state has driven pol-
icy change, some calls for change come as a result of public consciousness 
about the plight of indigent defendants.162 Despite the Bail Reform Act of 
1966’s purpose in ensuring that a defendant’s inability to pay does not mean he 
or she remains in jail, statistics show that those most negatively affected by pre-
trial proceedings are the poor.163 This third wave of bail reform is epitomized 
by the Pretrial Justice Institute 3DaysCount campaign.164 3DaysCount seeks to 
facilitate reform at state level by modifying existing bail structures to enable 
local bail reform.165 The campaign draws its name from a statement made by 
Ferguson municipal court representatives who replied: “It’s only three days,” 
when asked why they did not track the amount of time defendants spent in jail 
before a hearing.166 Advocates for bail reform have found many ways to im-
prove pretrial opportunities so that they are more equitable for all, particularly 
through statewide efforts. 
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B. State Bail Reform 
In recent years, many states enacted legislation relating to pretrial reform, 
some specifically focusing on reducing or eliminating the use of cash bail in 
their pretrial processes, implementing the use of pretrial risk assessment tools, 
and limiting the number of defendants held in jail prior to trial.167 The federal 
government seemingly supports state measures for bail reform. For example, 
United States Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont introduced a bill to provide 
grants to states that seek to implement alternative pretrial systems and lower 
pretrial detention populations.168 The bill stated that grants would be withheld 
from states continuing to use money bail systems and require studies to show 
that pretrial processes are not resulting in disparate effects on those detained 
within the process.169 Similar bills were subsequently introduced to the U.S. 
House of Representatives.170  
In 2018, California passed Senate Bill 10 (SB 10)—the California Money 
Bail Reform Act (“the Act”)—which made national news as a significant legis-
lative example of criminal pretrial justice reform and declared California as the 
“first” to abolish its state’s cash bail system.171 However, while California’s ef-
forts are bigger in size and thus more notable, other state efforts to overhaul or 
reform cash bail systems have taken place in recent years. 
1. California: Move Toward Eliminating Cash Bail 
California’s correctional facilities have long-struggled with overcrowding, 
not only because the state has the largest prison system in the United States,172 
but because it “has one of the highest pretrial detention rates in the country.”173 
At the core of the California’s pretrial rate is one the “cruelest aspects of the 
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American criminal justice system”: the detention of a person simply accused 
for a crime because of their inability to pay bail.174 Most importantly, the 
state’s cash bail system reveals notable and widespread disparities.175 To illus-
trate, Joseph Warren—a sixty-year old, African American man—was charged 
with welfare fraud and his was bail set at $75,000, an amount he could not af-
ford to pay.176 As a result, he was left with two options: (1) remain incarcerated 
for the pendency of his case, or (2) plead guilty.177 Meanwhile, Tiffany Li—a 
wealthy real estate heir—was charged with murder and her bail was set at $35 
million.178 She posted $4 million in cash and pledged her $62 million property 
for her bail.179 Her ability to pay resulted in house arrest for the pendency of 
her case.180 The unfortunate common occurrence of stories like Mr. Warren’s 
made bail reform a legislative priority in California. 
Under the current system, the eligibility for pretrial release and the factors 
considered in making a pretrial release decision are specifically outlined in 
provisions of the California constitution, penal code, and the rules of court.181 
For example, the state constitution provides that “a person shall be released on 
bail by sufficient sureties,” except if charged for any of the enumerated offens-
es.182 This provision additionally provides that a court cannot require excessive 
bail and authorizes the exercise of judicial discretion in granting release on own 
recognizance.183 Moreover, each county in the state is required to prepare a uni-
form bail schedule, which superior court judges are required to review annually 
for misdemeanor offenses.184 Pretrial release decisions may also be guided by 
evidence based risk assessments.185 However, bail amounts prescribed in bail 
schedules and the risk assessment tools vary from county to county.186 
After an arrest, a judge assesses the severity of the crime and bail is set in 
accordance with the county bail schedule.187 To be released, an individual must 
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either pay their bail in full or pay 10 percent to a bonding company.188 In the 
case that a person cannot afford to pay their bail, they must appear before the 
judge within forty-eight hours, where the judge will decide what bail the person 
should be afforded; at this point, the judge has absolute discretion over the pre-
trial release.189 Ultimately, a judge has three choices: (1) keep the person de-
tained; (2) release the person on his or her own recognizances; or (3) set bail.190 
In deciding the best option, the judge considers the potential danger to people 
in the community, other evidence offered by the defendant regarding their ties 
to the community, and their ability to post bond.191 After a review of all the rel-
evant factors, the judge makes an individualized decision.192 At this stage, the 
judge must set bail in an amount that is “reasonable and sufficient” to ensure 
the individual will appear in court.193 In setting bail, the judge may analyze ad-
ditional factors such as public safety (regarded as the primary or most im-
portant factor), the nature of the offense, the individual’s criminal record, and 
the probability of the individual appearing at future court appearances.194 
The variation of pretrial processes and notable disparities resulting from 
these processes at the state and local level revealed the need for serious pretrial 
reform in California especially because the state has one of the highest pretrial 
rates in the country.195 Moreover, the reform was particularly timely in consid-
eration of the Court of Appeal of California for the First Appellate Division’s 
decision concluding that California’s use of bail schedules is unconstitutional 
and holding that a judge must consider a defendant’s ability to pay when setting 
bail.196 After many failed attempts, bail reform finally made its way to Gover-
nor Jerry Brown’s desk in 2018.197 State Senator Robert Herzberg, along with 
several co-authors, successfully introduced SB 10.198 
At face value, the Act was set to resolve California’s correctional institu-
tion overcrowding issue by scraping away at its pretrial detention and imple-
menting a process through which presumptively innocent people would no 
longer remain detained simply because they cannot afford bail.199 However, in 
the last minutes before its passage, many notable institutions and organizations 
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that first supported the Act drew back support.200 Proponents of the Act argued 
that the legislation would create a just system that no longer unfairly impacts 
people of color and those in poverty, and would decrease jail populations and 
enhance public safety.201 It was expected that long-time advocates from crimi-
nal justice would similarly support the Act, but that was not the case.202  
Aside from the obvious impact the Act would have on the bail bonds in-
dustry,203 prominent advocates and organizations claimed this bail reform 
would do more harm than good. Prominent progressive organizations, such as 
the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California (“ACLU”), argued 
that the new law authorized expansive power to the courts and increased prose-
cutorial discretion.204 The ACLU withdrew its support for the law after it was 
amended,205 and expressed disappointment when SB 10 was signed into law by 
Governor Brown on August 28, 2018:  
[The California Money Bail Reform Act] is not the model for pretrial justice and 
racial equity that California should strive for. It cannot guarantee a substantial 
reduction in the number of Californians detained while awaiting trial, nor does it 
sufficiently address racial bias in pretrial decision making. Indeed, key provi-
sions of the new law create significant new risks and problems.206 
Moreover, the ACLU believed the new law would lead to more people be-
ing detained before trial than in the previous system because of the process put 
into place by the law which required the California Judicial Council—run by 
California judges—to approve the tool each county proposes to use.207 Addi-
tionally, the Act contained a provision that widened prosecutorial power by al-
                                                        
200  Jenna Lane, Liberal Groups Withdraw Support For Ending Cash Bail In California, 
RADIO.COM (Aug. 24, 2018, 11:26 AM), https://kcbsradio.radio.com/blogs/jenna-
lane/liberal-groups-withdraw-support-bill-end-cash-bail-california [https://perma.cc/HKP3-
LPT4]. 
201  Harrison, supra note 197, at 545–46.  
202  Ulloa, supra note 187. 
203  Id. 
204  See e.g., Jeremy B. White, California Ended Cash Bail. Why Are So Many Reformers 
Unhappy About It?, POLITICO (Aug. 29, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/08/29/california-abolish-cash-bail-reformers-
unhappy-219618 [https://perma.cc/Q9RL-8ULQ] (“The ACLU, NAACP and Human Rights 
Watch all abandoned their support for a move they initially hailed as a breakthrough for jus-
tice and fairness.”). 
205  ACLU of California Changes Position to Oppose Bail Reform Legislation, ACLU S. 
CAL. (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.aclusocal.org/en/press-releases/aclu-california-changes-
position-oppose-bail-reform-legislation [https://perma.cc/QW2N-27VD] [hereinafter ACLU 
S. CAL.]. 
206  See ACLU of California Statement: Governor Brown Signs Bail Reform Legislation Op-
posed by ACLU, ACLU N. CAL. (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.aclunc.org/news/aclu-
california-statement-governor-brown-signs-bail-reform-legislation-opposed-aclu 
[https://perma.cc/KG6P-HMBY]; Harrison, supra note 197, at 542. 
207  See S.B. 10, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 36 (Cal. 2017) (as amended on Sept. 6, 2017); 
Eric Westervelt, California's Bail Overhaul May Do More Harm Than Good, Reformers 
Say, NPR (Oct. 2. 2018, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/02/651959950/californias-
bail-overhaul-may-do-more-harm-than-good-reformers-say [https://perma.cc/9PD3-97K9]. 
3 NEV. L.J. FORUM 9 5/7/2019  10:51 AM 
Spring 2019] TO BAIL OR NOT TO BAIL 33 
 
lowing the State to file motions for preventative detention.208 Opponents feared 
that authority will continue to disproportionately affect people of color and 
those living in poverty; thus, the Act would not systemically change the biases 
that underlie and perpetuate mass incarceration in California.209  
Furthermore, opponents were concerned the computerized system, the pre-
trial risk assessment tool, would detract from the individualized aspect of de-
ciding bail and result in decisions that reflect social biases.210 This concern is 
mainly rooted in the fact that the law is silent on the design of the algorithm.211 
On the other hand, supporters of the law argue the pretrial risk assessment tool 
would allow judges to make more informed decisions and ensure those classi-
fied as a high risk will not be released, though the previous system might have 
allowed for that opportunity.212 Under the new system, each county would have 
the discretion to set its own pretrial assessment tools which critics fear will al-
low biased assessment tools to negatively impact those who are most vulnera-
ble.213  
The enactment of the Act would overhaul California’s cash bail system en-
tirely. As passed, the Act repeals “existing laws regarding bail and require that 
any remaining references to bail refer to the procedures specified in the bill,”214 
The Act attempts to safely reduce the number of defendants incarcerated only 
because they cannot afford to post bail.215 Most notably, the Act eliminates the 
monetary aspect of California’s current bail statutes and replaces it with “ ‘risk 
assessments’ and other nonmonetary conditions.”216 To do this, the law requires 
each Superior Court to have an entity, division, or program that provides pretri-
al risk assessment services that would “assess the risk level of persons charged 
with the commission of a crime, report the results of the risk determination to 
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the court, and make recommendations for conditions of release of individuals 
pending adjudication of their criminal case.”217 
Under the Pretrial Assessment Services program, arrested individuals are 
categorized into low, medium, or high risk:218 
(b) “High risk” means that an arrested person, after determination of the per-
son’s risk following an investigation by Pretrial Assessment Services, including 
the use of a validated risk assessment tool, is categorized as having a significant 
level of risk of failure to appear in court as required or risk to public safety due 
to the commission of a new criminal offense while released on the current crim-
inal offense. 
(c) “Low risk” means that an arrested person, after determination of the person’s 
risk following an investigation by Pretrial Assessment Services, including the 
use of a validated risk assessment tool, is categorized as having a minimal level 
of risk of failure to appear in court as required or risk to public safety due to the 
commission of a new criminal offense while released on the current criminal of-
fense. 
(d) “Medium Risk” means that an arrested person, after determination of the 
person’s risk following an investigation by Pretrial Assessment Services, includ-
ing the use of a validated risk assessment tool, is categorized as having a moder-
ate level of risk of failure to appear in court as required or risk to public safety 
due to the commission of a new criminal offense while released on the current 
criminal offense. 
The Act specifies that a person arrested for a misdemeanor is booked and 
released within twelve hours without having a pretrial risk assessment, except 
as otherwise specified.219 A person classified as a low risk is to be released on 
his or her own recognizance.220 When defendants are categorized as a medium 
risk, the Superior Court is required to create a rule for Pretrial Assessment Ser-
vices to follow permitting the release of the medium risk individual on their 
own recognizance or supervised own recognizance.221 In the case where an in-
dividual is categorized as a high risk, the defendant is not to be released and 
must wait for their arraignment where a judge determines the defendant’s re-
lease.222 
However, it could often be the case that an individual is not released 
through the methods explained above. For those instances, the Act authorizes 
the court to hold a pre-arraignment review to determine whether certain condi-
tions would allow a safe release of the defendant to assure public safety and the 
defendant’s return to court.223 Moreover, at any time during the arraignment or 
the pendency of the case, the prosecution may file a motion for preventative de-
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tention.224 Once filed, a preventative detention hearing will take place.225 At the 
hearing, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that no condi-
tions or combination of conditions will reasonably assure public safety and the 
defendant will appear to future court dates.226 That finding must be made on the 
record.227 
This Golden State “victory,” however, for the proponents of the Act was 
short lived. After the passage of the Act, the bail industry worked quickly to 
require the question of whether to implement SB 10 to be put forth to Califor-
nia voters as a referendum in 2020.228 This roadblock has not stopped other ju-
dicial and legislative reforms related to bail throughout the state. For example, 
Governor Gavin Newsom allocated $75 million to support courts’ experiments 
with alternatives to bail under the direction of a Judicial Council specifically 
created to “advise counties on how to implement alternatives to bail.”229 Addi-
tionally, the State Supreme Court will soon rule on a case said to provide im-
mediate changes to the state’s pretrial process.230  
As briefly discussed above, the Court of Appeal of California for the First 
Appellate Division decision concluded that California’s use of bail schedules is 
unconstitutional and held that a judge must consider a defendant’s ability to pay 
when setting bail.231 This case involves Kenneth Humphrey whose bail was 
originally set at $600,000 after being charged “with burglary and robbery based 
on allegations that he followed a fellow resident of his senior living facility into 
his apartment and stole $5 and a bottle of cologne.”232 Mr. Humphrey’s bail 
was later reduced to $350,000, an amount he could still not afford to pay.233 
The California State Supreme Court has an opportunity to uphold the Court of 
Appeal’s decision to effectuate an immediate change in the state’s pretrial pro-
cesses.234 That change would require “prosecutors to prove that a person is too 
dangerous to be released—and if they[] [are] not, to set reasonable conditions 
for their freedom before trial.”235  
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Additionally, while the fate of SB 10 is unknown, the bill’s author, State 
Sen. Robert Hertzberg, proposed new “legislation that would require any coun-
ties experimenting with alternatives to bail to collect data on who is being re-
leased and under what conditions” with the goal of using the information to 
“ensure that the same economic and racial inequities that exist under the exist-
ing bail system do[] [not] continue [to] persist under alternatives to bail.”236 
Moreover, with the uncertainty surrounding the future of the state’s cash 
bail system, the University of California Los Angeles School of Law wasted no 
time implementing change. UCLA School of Law’s criminal justice program 
partnered with the Bail Project, the Bronx Defenders, and the Los Angeles 
County Public Defender’s office to launch a pilot program in Compton, Cali-
fornia.237 The intended goal is to reduce or eliminate bail “for people who have 
been charged with felonies and who might face lengthy pretrial stays behind 
bars only because they cannot afford bail.”238 The program called for UCLA 
law students to work alongside public defenders at the Los Angeles Superior 
Court in Compton.239 Compton served as the perfect “petri dish” because seven 
out of every ten clients in the Los Angeles County Public Defender’s Compton 
branch cannot afford bail and wait in jail while their attorney argues their 
case.240 Though the program is still new, of the fourteen people the pilot pro-
gram has represented, eleven secured a bail reduction and pretrial release.241 
Other documented successes include: 
• The court allowed for the release of six clients on their own recognizance 
after incarceration periods of between five and sixteen weeks and 
where bail was set between $30,000 and $70,000.  
• Three of the six clients “were ordered into drug-treatment facilities where 
they maintained contact with their families and jobs while awaiting tri-
al.”  
• Another client had their bail reduced from $30,000 to $3,000. The client’s 
bail was paid by the Bail Project to allow for the client’s release during 
the pendency of his case., which was later dismissed.242  
In re Humphrey has also made asking for bail reductions easier because the 
state appellate court ruled that when setting bail, a judge should consider a de-
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fendant’s ability to pay.243 Program leaders hope their efforts “shift the culture” 
by proving to judges that releasing people on low or no bail has no correlation 
to whether someone will make their court appearance or increases rates of 
crime.244 In its short time, the pilot program has demonstrated success and 
leaders are motivated to expand to other counties with significant amounts of 
presumably innocent people in jail because they cannot afford bail.245 
2. D.C. Bail Reform: Creation of a Dedicated Pretrial Service Agency 
The policy push to eliminate cash bail in California is not a new concept.246 
In 1992, Washington, D.C. eliminated cash bail and established a dedicated 
agency within the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency called the 
Pretrial Services Agency (“D.C.’s PSA”).247 This program is statutorily pre-
cluded from supervising surety bail releases from the D.C. Superior Court.248 
Moreover, the program assists both the D.C. Superior Court and the U.S. Dis-
trict Court by “formulating release recommendations and providing supervision 
and treatment services to defendants which reasonably assure that those on 
conditional release return to court and do not engage in criminal activity pend-
ing their trial and/or sentencing.”249 The program has several goals including 
maintaining a defendant’s presumption of innocence while using pro-social in-
terventions, effective use of technology, and human capital to secure the non-
financial conditional release of defendants.250 Additionally, the D.C. PSA oper-
ates under the assumption that reliance on money bail discriminates against the 
indigent and does not effectively address public concerns with pretrial re-
lease.251  
Currently, the program fulfills its mission by both gathering information on 
defendants and then supervising defendants released from custody, as well as 
providing the judiciary with “objective, verified” data to allow for the best de-
cision.252 Information is collected through a “client,” rather than defendant, in-
terview conducted by the D.C. PSA program officer with the purpose of gather-
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ing information on seventy factors later recorded in a database that calculates 
the client’s risk of flight or potential for committing another crime.253 Officers 
then present this information to judicial officers to recommend the least restric-
tive conditions for release, while maintaining public safety and ensuring a re-
turn to court.254 Ultimately, the decision of a defendant’s release or stay in cus-
tody rests with a judicial officer.255 The combination of the interview, use of a 
risk assessment algorithm, and recommendation by D.C.’s PSA allows a judge 
to gauge a person’s “likelihood of succeeding.”256 
Following the judiciary’s decision, the agency continues to supervise de-
fendants released from custody to ensure they are complying with conditions of 
release.257 The agency gives defendants the opportunity to participate in pro-
social interventions and reminders to help assure they appear for their schedule 
court hearing.258 Moreover, the program offers an established line of communi-
cation with all parties by notifying the prosecution, defense, and court of the 
client’s compliance or non-compliance to allow parties to promptly respond to 
any violations.259 Establishing these lines of communication has proven to be 
an important way to keep the program working toward its goal. A recent study 
by the University of Chicago found that receiving any pre-court message re-
duced failure to appear rates by 21%.260 Further, the study revealed that making 
use of consequence-based messages (those stating what would happen should a 
defendant fail to appear in court) combined with plan-making messages (re-
minders to help defendants think ahead) were more effective than consequence 
or reminders alone.261 The hope is that this continued monitoring and reporting 
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will minimize pretrial detention, reduce jail crowding, and ensure that pretrial 
services are administered fairly while promoting public safety.262  
D.C. has had quantifiable success with their system. In fiscal year 2017, 
D.C. released 94% of arrestees at their arraignment.263 Moreover, the D.C. Ju-
diciary agreed with 76% of D.C.’s PSA recommendations.264 Of those released 
for any crime, 88% remained arrest-free, with 99% of those on release for a vi-
olent crime remaining arrest-free.265 Further, 88% of clients made all their 
scheduled court appearances and 87% remained on continued pretrial release 
without a request for removal or revocation for non-compliance.266 
However, D.C.’s program is not without its criticisms. In May of 2016, a 
defendant out on pretrial release bypassed a court-ordered monitoring device by 
detaching his prosthetic leg and then fatally shot a woman.267 Additionally, on 
July 4, 2015, a man released on a misdemeanor charge of assaulting a police 
officer fatally stabbed a passenger on D.C.’s metro.268 Further, D.C.’s statistics 
relating to re-arrest numbers of defendants on pretrial release are not conclusive 
of a lack of crime, just indicative of simply not being caught.  
D.C.’s PSA has effectively built a system that all but eliminates cash bail. 
Thus, jurisdictions wanting to develop or reform their own pretrial services 
should look to D.C.’s PSA as a model of certain successes. By implementing an 
agency that focuses on combining technology and human capital, pretrial ser-
vice agencies can create individualized plans that more readily meet the needs 
of defendants and constructively eliminate cash bail.  
3. New Jersey’s Approach: Algorithmic Pretrial Assessment  
One attempt to curb the injustice of current bail systems is to implement 
the use of risk assessment tools developed by universities, governments, and 
nonprofit agencies.269 A prime example of this is New Jersey’s move from 
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money bail to a risk assessment system in 2017.270 Following a report showing 
that on a single day 5,000 people in New Jersey were able to be released on bail 
but could not afford it, the New Jersey Supreme Court established a committee 
in 2013 to examine issues related to bail and pretrial reform.271 The committee 
recommended significant changes to New Jersey’s pretrial practices and crimi-
nal justice system.272 The committee suggested that the state move from a cash-
based system of pretrial release to a risk-based system, create and implement a 
pretrial supervision process, and make preventative detention the rarity.273 
These recommendations became law in New Jersey and took effect in January 
2017.274 Switching from a system based solely on instinct and experience (often 
referred to as “gut instinct”) to one in which judges have access to scientific, 
objective risk assessment tools could further the criminal justice system’s cen-
tral goals of increasing public safety, reducing crime, and making the most ef-
fective, fair, and efficient use of public resources.275 
New Jersey turned to the Laura and John Arnold Foundation (LJAF) for 
the implementation of a “scientific, objective” risk assessment tool.276 LJAF’s 
risk assessment tool, known as the Public Safety Assessment (PSA), is de-
signed to predict risk in three areas: risk of failure to appear (FTA), risk of new 
criminal activity (NCA), and risk of new violent criminal activity (NVCA).277 
The PSA is designed to make this assessment without a defendant interview 
based on nine factors drawn from court records, which include:278  
1. age at current arrest . . . . 
2. current violent offense . . . . 
3. pending charge at the time of the offense . . . . 
4. prior disorderly persons conviction . . . . 
5. prior indictable convictions . . . . 
6. prior violent conviction . . . . 
7. prior failure to appear at a pre-disposition court date in the last two 
years . . . . 
8. prior failure to appear at a pre-disposition court date more than two 
years ago . . . . 
9. prior sentence to incarceration . . . .279 
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These nine factors are used to determine scores from one to six in the three 
areas that the PSA seeks to predict.280 By using these scores, the PSA provides 
judges with a recommendation about the conditions of release or detention ac-
cording to the Decision Making Framework (DMF).281 The PSA would rec-
ommend a defendant with a new criminal activity (NCA) score of one and a 
failure to appear (FTA) score of two be released on their own recognizance.282 
Whereas, a defendant with a new criminal activity (NCA) score of five and an 
FTA score of three would receive release on a Pretrial Monitoring Level (PML) 
of three. A defendant receives a “risk of new violent criminal activity” (NVCA) 
flag based on the nature of their current charge and prior criminal convictions, 
meaning that it is less likely for a defendant flagged for violent crimes to be 
recommended for release.283 For example, if a defendant’s PSA scores result in 
a NVCA flag, and their current offense is violent, then the DMF will not rec-
ommend release or will recommend release on the most restrictive condi-
tions.284 Judges may depart from the recommendations created by the PSA and 
DMF, but must explain their reasons for doing so.285 
New Jersey hopes that this model will curb the system’s bias towards de-
tention, develop a better understanding of which defendants pose a greater risk 
of flight or danger, and help to eliminate all biases in the system.286 However, 
the system is not above critique. Many factors that the PSA is built on can be 
“profoundly affected by race, class, neighborhood and the ability to afford a 
lawyer.”287 Indeed, Marie VanNostrand, the “architect” of the PSA, stated her-
self that “[w]e can[not] eliminate bias, but we can disrupt the cycle of bias and 
that[] [is] what this tool is intended to do.”288 
Following the first year of using the PSA in New Jersey, pretrial jail popu-
lations fell by 20%, from 7,173 on January 2017, to 5,743 on December 
2017.289 Soon after the adoption and implementation of the PSA and DMF, the 
Pretrial Justice Institute released a state by state report on the status of pretrial 
Justice in America and gave New Jersey the only “A grade” in its state by state 
survey.290 However, in its own report, the New Jersey Judiciary addressed chal-
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lenges related to the new criminal justice reforms.291 The main three challenges 
the judiciary highlighted were: the ongoing funding of the Pretrial Services 
Program via court fees is “simply not sustainable”; the inability of staff to assist 
defendants with mental health, housing, or substance abuse; and issues related 
to electronic monitoring of defendants on pretrial release.292 
Despite these potential challenges, algorithmic pretrial assessments are 
gaining traction across America. The PSA is used in Arizona, Kentucky, Rhode 
Island, and Utah.293 The major metropolitan areas of Chicago, Houston, and 
New Orleans have also adopted the PSA’s risk assessment model used by New 
Jersey.294 In New Orleans, the bail bonds industry argued that this “financial 
collateral is the only effective way to ensure defendants return to court for their 
trial.”295 To test this argument, the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court insti-
tuted a risk assessment tool to test if the defendant released without cash bail 
would be likely to return.296 Orleans Parish Criminal District Court used a risk 
assessment tool developed by the Vera Institute that uses data on prior missed 
court appearances, criminal history, age, and residency to predict a defendant’s 
likelihood to fail to appear in court or be re-arrested during pretrial release.297 
Before the institution of this system, the average jail stay for a low risk defend-
ant was twelve days.298 After a few months, the average jail stay fell to two 
days.299 Further, defendants returned to court at “roughly” the same rate as de-
fendants in other jurisdictions.300 
By using a risk assessment tool designed to separately evaluate both the 
potential for failure to appear at subsequent court dates and new criminal ar-
rests, judges are given more options when making pretrial decisions. The use of 
a decision-making matrix like the DMF in conjunction with designated risk 
scores allows judges to further know what pretrial conditions might be the least 
restrictive outside of bail. Jurisdictions looking to implement risk assessment 
tools can look to New Jersey’s use and roll out of the PSA with DMF for an 
example of successful implementation. While New Jersey’s pretrial reforms are 
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not without issue, the tool was a demonstrable step in the right direction to-
wards integrating objective risk assessment factors with the judicial discretion 
needed to make individualized decisions. 
4. Bail Reform Where Commercial Bonds are Outlawed: The Illinois 
Example 
Even states without commercial bail bonds are looking to reform their pre-
trial practices to ensure justice for defendants.301 Illinois, Kentucky, Oregon, 
and Wisconsin abolished commercial bail bonds and created a system of per-
centage bonds.302 So, rather than direct bail deposits to private business, these 
states require bail deposits directly to the court.303 For example, in Illinois, de-
pending on a defendant’s condition of release, state law requires defendants pay 
10 percent or the full amount.304 The amount paid is set by a bail schedule for 
most misdemeanor charges including traffic, ordinance, conservation, and petty 
offenses.305 For a felony offense, judicial discretion dictates the amount of 
bail.306 When making the bail-setting decision the judge considers: the nature 
and circumstances of the offense charged, whether evidence shows use or threat 
of violence, and thirty-five other statutorily defined factors.307 The majority of 
Illinois courts use these factors combined with the Virginia Pretrial Risk As-
sessment Instrument (VPRAI) to determine whether pretrial custody is neces-
sary and the amount of bail that should be set.308  
In 2003, the Virginia Department of Criminal Services developed the 
VPRAI, a risk assessment tool, to assist judges in making pretrial release deci-
sions.309 VPRAI is an automated computer program that uses nine factors, such 
as the type of charge, any other pending charges, length at current residence, 
and employment status, to determine a defendant’s risk level and then suggest 
conditions for release.310 California and Virginia currently use the VPRAI 
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tool.311 Under VPRAI, if a defendant receives a recommendation for bail and 
they are unable to pay, they are given a second hearing within seven days to de-
termine an adjusted or waiver of bail.312 If a defendant makes all of their court 
appearances, the full bail amount, or their adjusted bail amount, is returned mi-
nus the cost of administrative fees.313 Moreover, “[i]f the defendant fails to 
make all court appearances, a bond forfeiture hearing may be conducted.”314  
Additionally, in 2016, Illinois collected data on pretrial services from a 
quarter of its counties.315 In those counties, there were 15,390 new pretrial cas-
es.316 Of those defendants released on bond, 1,248 had their bond revoked for 
committing a new offense (33%), a rule violation (29%), or a failure to make a 
court appearance (39%).317 After that data was collected, the Illinois legislature 
passed the Illinois Bail Reform Act of 2017 (“the Act”).318 The Act sought to 
push Illinois’s courts further away from the use of monetary bail.319 This Act 
created a presumption that any condition of pretrial release would be the least 
restrictive condition to assure the defendant’s appearance in court and non-
monetary in nature.320 These conditions of release “may include” but are not 
limited to: electronic monitoring; curfews; drug counseling; stay-away orders; 
and in person reporting.321  
The Act also specifically addresses the amount of bail.322 A defendant’s 
bail must assure compliance with conditions set in the bail bond, must not be 
oppressive, and must be made in consideration of the defendant’s ability to 
pay.323 The Act creates two categories of offenses: A and B.324 Category A of-
fenses are class 1 and 2 felonies, as well as additional statutorily defined felo-
nies.325 Category B offenses are qualified as petty offenses, business offenses, 
class A, B, and C misdemeanors, and any class 3 or 4 felony not defined as a 
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category A offense.326 Any defendant who is charged with a Category B of-
fense and remains in custody because they are unable to financially secure their 
release must be brought back before the court for a rehearing on the conditions 
of their release.327 Accordingly, the amount of the bail is reduced by $30.00 for 
every day incarcerated while awaiting a hearing.328 While more collected data 
and research is required, in the wake of Illinois’ steps toward pretrial reform, 
PJI did give them a “C” grade in their 2017 review of the state, which was 
above the national average of “D.”329 
As states across the country seek to eliminate the flaws of the classic bail 
system, the major goals are equity and a just outcome for presumably innocent 
defendants. As California seeks to completely eliminate cash bail through legis-
lative efforts, other jurisdictions like New Jersey, Illinois, and Washington D.C. 
have demonstrated that by generating more pretrial alternatives, cash bail can 
cease to be the default and become the last resort option. Ultimately, Califor-
nia’s attempt at reform shows that the “quick fix,” statewide option does not 
work. Instead, states should seek to involve stakeholders, research, and phase 
into bail setting alternatives supported by data for judges to make their deter-
minations.  
C. Executive Driven Pretrial Reform 
State executive branches across the country have also acted to reform pre-
trial practices and allocate funding to better service pretrial defendants.330 For 
example, in 2015, Governor Tom Wolf of Pennsylvania requested support from 
the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and the 
Pew Charitable Trust (Pew) to provide technical assistance with the state’s ef-
forts of criminal justice reform.331 The initiative found that the state had inade-
quate pretrial and sentencing guidance.332 Further, the initiative showed the 
state’s counties seldom used pretrial risk assessments and that black defendants 
were far more likely than white defendants to receive a monetary bail deci-
sion.333 Following the findings of the initiative, a group of stakeholders, includ-
ing bipartisan law makers, agency heads, and members of the judiciary, voted 
to implement policy changes to correct these disparities.334 In 2019, the Gover-
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nor announced that following this focus on criminal justice reform, Pennsylva-
nia prison populations experienced the largest decrease in 40 years.335 Most re-
cently, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo proposed regulatory revisions to 
New York’s Bail bond industry.336 This regulatory review is intended to elimi-
nate predatory practices in the industry by standardizing bail bond contracts, 
fees, and documents involved in bail transactions.337 These measures are meant 
to provide consumer protection and to “raise the standards of integrity in the 
bail business.”338 
D. Judiciary Driven Pretrial Reform 
Another driving force behind pretrial reform are judiciaries across the 
country.339 Some state judiciaries have written explicit recommendations,340 es-
tablished blue ribbon commissions,341 and formed specific committees342 to 
look into pretrial release practices. To illustrate, legal stakeholders in Illinois 
petitioned the State Supreme Court to adopt a statewide rule to protect indigent 
defendants from pretrial detention when they have an inability to pay.343 This 
group included eighty-seven attorneys, prosecutors, judges, and law profes-
sors.344 The group highlighted how cash bail had strong evidence of wealth and 
race-based discrimination: “Seventy-three percent of people detained in the 
Cook County jail are African-American, and Black defendants on average re-
ceive higher bail amounts . . . .”345 These stakeholders urged their Supreme 
Court to act “as soon as possible.”346 Moreover, in Orange and Oscelos coun-
ties in Florida, prosecutors are limiting the offenses they seek bail for, calling 
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and-increase-transparency-bail-bond-industry [https://perma.cc/83Q7-47LU]. 
339  WHERE PRETRIAL IMPROVEMENTS ARE HAPPENING, supra note 330, at 3.  
340  Id. In 2016, Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye highlighted ten recommendations made 
by a commission in California that eventually lead to provisions in SB 10.  
341  Id. The Colorado Supreme Court established a blue ribbon commission that looked into 
maintaining the presumption of innocence while preserving a victims right to be safe and 
informed in the pretrial process. 
342  Id.  
343  Id. 
344  Id. 
345  Kwame Raoul, Imprisoned for Poverty: Why Cash Bail Needs Reform, MEDIUM (Aug. 8, 
2018), https://medium.com/@kwameraoul/imprisoned-for-poverty-why-cash-bail-needs-
reform-e9f8c7710e05 [https://perma.cc/58B3-QS4Q]. 
346  WHERE PRETRIAL IMPROVEMENTS ARE HAPPENING, supra note 330, at 1. 
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bail a “poverty penalty.”347 Charges that prosecutors will no longer seek bail 
for include: driving without a license or vehicle registration; disorderly intoxi-
cation; panhandling; loitering; and low-level drug crimes, like possession of 
drug paraphernalia.348 This stakeholder led change can be very effective and 
involve minimal disruption to current court programs. 
Jurisdictions looking to reform their pretrial practices should follow the 
successful examples arising from executive and judicial driven reform. By cre-
ating a dialogue about the issues associated with pretrial proceedings and bail, 
stakeholders are finding ways to improve their jurisdiction’s systems. Execu-
tive driven reform seemingly works best when trying to develop data and regu-
late the commercial bond industry. Judicial efforts help to create a dialogue and 
allow both prosecutors and defense attorneys to present their recommendations 
without disrupting current practices.  
III. CONCERNS REGARDING COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL COURT TOOLS USED TO 
SET BAIL AND REFORM PRETRIAL SYSTEMS 
With jails being the front door to incarceration, one of the earliest and most 
important opportunities for the exercise of judicial discretion presents itself 
during the bail assessment process.349 As states make strides in pretrial reform 
and create alternatives to their current bail setting practices, it is important to 
note major concerns surrounding popular tools used to guide—or possibly dis-
rupt—judicial discretion, including bail schedules and pretrial risk assessments. 
A. Constitutionality of Bail Schedules 
On September 3, 2015, the Calhoun Police Department of Georgia arrested 
Maurice Walker, a 54-year old African American man, on the charge of “pe-
destrian under the influence” for allegedly drunkenly walking down a stretch of 
highway.350 At the time of his arrest, police informed Mr. Walker that he would 
remain incarcerated unless he paid the $160 fixed cash bond set by the City of 
                                                        
347  Id.  
348  Id. 
349  Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion, PRETRIAL JUST. 
INST. (Dec. 6, 2010), 
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Document
FileKey=b646a57f-6399-2fe4-5683-021480c3634a [https://perma.cc/J4TN-ZNWE]. 
350  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee and Urging 
Affirmance on the Issue Addressed Herein at 8, Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245 
(11th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-10521-HH); see also Rhonda Cook, Calhoun Case: Should a Poor 
Person Who Can’t Make Bail Be Held in Jail?, ATLANTA J. CONSTITUTION (Sept. 26, 2016), 
https://www.ajc.com/news/local/calhoun-case-should-poor-person-who-can-make-bail-
heldijail/HKd1Rb8ki1U9nV8bCPUGsM/ [https://perma.cc/H5DV-K9MS]; Brandi Owczarz, 
Judge Grants Injunction in Walker Case, CALHOUN TIMES (Feb. 3, 2016), 
http://www.northwestgeorgianews.com/calhoun_times/judge-grants-injunction-in-walker-
case/article_63b26648-c9ee-11e5-9f69-8b1c8c3b5116.html [https://perma.cc/SGG7-MH89].  
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Calhoun’s bail schedule for the misdemeanor charge he incurred.351 Due to his 
inability to pay, Mr. Walker remained confined to the Gordon County Jail for 
six days.352 Mr. Walker’s release was triggered by a lawsuit filed by the South-
ern Center for Human Rights (SCHR).353 The central issue in the case was 
“whether a city can detain indigent people accused of misdemeanors for up to 
seven days without any inquiry into their ability to pay bail” creating a bail sys-
tem that violated the Fourteenth Amendment.354 Importantly, Mr. Walker’s 
case highlights an important aspect of the cash bail debate—the court’s use of 
and reliance on bail schedules in its bail determinations.355 
                                                        
351  Brief for the United States, supra note 350, at 9; Owczarz, supra note 350.  
352  Owczarz, supra note 350. 
353  Carrie Teegardin, Walking While Intoxicated Case Could Force Changes in Georgia 
Courts, ATLANTA J. CONSTITUTION (Jan. 30, 2016), 
https://www.ajc.com/blog/investigations/walking-while-intoxicated-case-could-force-
changes-georgia-courts/Eekuie6PsbcJOIvF8vg5sO/ [https://perma.cc/Y4LH-KTDG].  
354  Cook, supra note 350.  
355  Within a few months of Walker’s release, the City of Calhoun enacted a “48-hour rule” 
guaranteeing an appearance before a judge within 48 hours with representation and an op-
portunity to “object to a bail amount on claims of indigency.” Bill Rankin, Court Upholds 
Jail for Some Too Poor to Post Bail, ATLANTA J. CONSTITUTION (Aug. 23, 2018), 
https://www.ajc.com/news/local/court-upholds-calhoun-practices-for-poor-people-who-can-
post-bail/a1RQZis8RgKZyviuClJfCI/ [https://perma.cc/BY2Q-Y3TL]. However, a U.S. Dis-
trict Judge Harold Murphy wrote that despite the newly enacted rule, the rule was insuffi-
cient to invalidate Walker’s suit because it “simply shorten[ed] the amount of time that indi-
gent arrestees are held in jail . . . . Any detention based solely on financial status or ability to 
pay is impermissible.” Cook, supra note 350. Judge Murphy issued a preliminary injunction 
prohibiting the city from holding anyone charged with a misdemeanor until its “post-arrest 
procedures” complied with the U.S. Constitution. Id. The City of Calhoun appealed to the 
11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Walker v. City of Calhoun, CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY 
CTR., https://www.theusconstitution.org/litigation/walker-v-city-of-calhoun/ 
[https://perma.cc/WHF8-7UWH] (last visited Mar. 4, 2019). In a 2-1 decision, the 11th U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Calhoun’s revised bail system stating that: 
Walker and other indigents suffer no ‘absolute deprivation’ of the benefit they seek, namely pre-
trial release. Rather, they must merely wait some appropriate amount of time to receive the same 
benefit as the more affluent. Indeed, after such delay, they arguably receive preferential treat-
ment, in at least one respect, by being released on recognizance without having to provide any 
security. 
Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2018). Moreover, the court 
concluded that under Supreme Court precedent “indigency determinations for purposes of 
setting bail are presumptively constitutional if made within 48 hours of arrest.” Id. at 1266. 
Despite the 11th Circuit’s ruling, Walker’s case fell right into a hot debate about the criminal 
justice system: should people with money be able to buy their freedom when people without 
money must wait behind bars? Moreover, the Walker case illustrates how dependence on 
cash bail has created a two-tiered criminal justice system in the majority of states across the 
country. Wykstra, supra note 44.The disparities created by the cash bail system are particu-
larly recognizable amongst low-income people of color. Rabuy & Kapf, supra note 163; see 
also JESSICA EAGLIN AND DANYELLE SOLOMON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, REDUCING 
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN JAILS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LOCAL PRACTICE 20 
(2015), 
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Racial%20Disparities%20Repo
rt%20062515.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC5P-VGPP]. Notably, in its decision, the 11th Circuit 
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“[B]ail schedules are procedural schemes that provide judges with stand-
ardized money bail amounts based upon the offense charged, regardless of the 
characteristics of an individual defendant.”356 The tool’s use and a court’s reli-
ance on the tool varies; a poll by the Pretrial Justice Institute revealed that ap-
proximately 64 percent of poll participants stated that their jurisdiction used a 
bail schedule to determine bail or supplement its bail setting practices.357 Pro-
ponents argue that “pre-set bonds are constitutional and provide a guarantee 
that the accused will come to court appointments.”358 Moreover, they assert that 
the tool’s use ensures public safety by creating categories of serious offenses 
that allow the court to hold defendants without bail.359  
On the other hand, criminal justice reform advocates argue the tool is un-
constitutional because there is no mechanism within it that determines whether 
a defendant is indigent.360 Specifically, opponents assert that “fee structures 
place an undue burden on indigent defendants, who may have more difficulty 
paying bail, including relatively low bail fees associated with misdemeanor of-
fenses, than non-indigents defendants accused of similar offenses.”361 As a re-
sult, an unintentional result of a court’s use of a bail schedules is “the unneces-
sary detention of misdemeanants, indigents, and non-dangerous defendants” 
because they cannot afford to pay a predetermined bail amount.362 As discussed 
earlier, the unintentional and unnecessary detention of a defendant has serious 
collateral costs, including family separation, unemployment, and loss of ties to 
their community.363  
Judicial discretion is an important facet of a fair and equitable criminal jus-
tice system.364 The concern with the use of bail schedules at this stage is that 
the tool can “represent an improper and ill-advised, if not illegal, substitute for 
judicial discretion at bail” and “encourage[s] an automated approach to pretrial 
release decision-making by compelling reliance upon a single fixed bail condi-
tion—money—found in a predetermined schedule based solely on the defend-
ant’s highest charge.”365 Thus, the use of a bail schedule—particularly in juris-
                                                                                                                                
states that individuals behind bars simply charged for misdemeanors “must merely wait 
some appropriate amount of time to receive the same benefit as the more affluent.” Walker, 
901 F.3d at 1262. What is an appropriate amount of time? Across the country, people simply 
charged for a crime wait months, even years. Wykstra, supra note 44. 
356  Carlson, supra note 349.  
357  Id. 
358  Cook, supra note 350. 
359  Alison M. Smith, State Money-Bail Systems: Differing Approaches, CONGR. RES. SERV. 
1, 2 (Nov. 27, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10220.pdf [https://perma.cc/48NV-
JTFW]. 
360  Cook, supra note 350. 
361  Smith, supra note 359. 
362  Carlson, supra note 349. 
363  Id.; see discussion supra Part I. 
364  Carlson, supra note 349. 
365  Id. 
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dictions that only use a bail schedule to determine bail—may reduce a judge’s 
consideration of statutorily enumerated factors to provide for a balance of a 
person’s “liberty interest against public safety and court integrity concerns.”366 
As a result of these concerns, various jurisdictions have considered or are cur-
rently considering the constitutionality of bail schedules.367 
B. The Problem with Pretrial Risk Assessments 
Jurisdictions are increasingly turning to risk assessment instruments to ad-
dress issues associated with the money bail systems during the pretrial release 
and bail setting process.368 These tools are said to provide judges with a scien-
tific model for predicting the risk of whether a defendant will fail to appear for 
trial or commit crime during the pretrial period.369 Though advocates of risk 
assessments acknowledge such a tool may not account for the totality of a giv-
en defendant’s situation, they argue that when used in conjunction with profes-
sional judgment, the tool is an improvement over professional judgment 
alone.370 
A court may use a risk assessment instrument in a variety of circumstances, 
including in the pretrial context to gauge the risk an individual has of failing to 
appear for court proceedings or being arrested while awaiting trial.371 These 
risk assessments tools are developed by analyzing large numbers of cases to 
identify factors that strongly correlate with the action that a court’s risk assess-
ment tool is intended to predict.372 Once a risk assessment tool is developed, it 
is then used to measure and score risk factors to produce a defendant’s risk 
score.373 Factors measured in a risk assessment tools may include marital histo-
ry, residence history, and employment status.374 However, critics argue that 
such factors may serve as “proxies” for minority status and poverty.375 Since 
these factors are not related to an individual’s blameworthiness and may be 
outside of the individual’s control, they are particularly objectionable.376 
Though these factors may correlate with increased risk, they also have a dispar-
ate impact on minority and impoverished populations.  
                                                        
366  Id. 
367  Id.; see, e.g., Pelekai v. White, 861 P.2d 1205 (Haw. 1993); Clark v. Hall, 53 P.3d 416 
(Okla. Crim. App. 2002); see also discussion supra Section II.B.i.  
368  MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 10, at 19. 
369  Id. at 5. 
370  Erin Harbinson, Understanding Risk Assessment Tools, 75 BENCH & B. MINN. 14, 16–17 
(2018). 
371  MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 10, at 18. 
372  Harbinson, supra note 370, at 15. 
373  Jennifer L. Skeem & Christopher Lowenkamp, Risk, Race, and Recidivism: Predictive 
Bias and Disparate Impact, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 680, 682 (2016). 
374  Id. at 681. 
375  MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 10, at 22. 
376  Id. at 9. 
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While risk assessment tools are created using scientific methods, a growing 
concern is that the tool is using faulty data to produce skewed outcomes be-
cause criminal justice data is known to be unreliable.377 Accordingly, critics of 
risk assessment instruments assert that the current use of such tools perpetuates 
the very biases and disparities that the cash bail system already has in place.378 
By relying on biased data to create the tools, taking into consideration factors 
that serve as proxies for minority status and poverty, and then applying such 
tools in a biased manner, the cycle of discrimination continues.379 Thus, those 
marginalized by the cash bail system are still marginalized under the nonmone-
tary pretrial release and bail setting process in jurisdictions that employ risk as-
sessment tools.380  
Moreover, even if the data used to create risk assessment tools and its fac-
tors are objective, there is still a possibility of bias in the application of the 
tools. There is a possibility that those who carry out the assessments may, at 
worst, manipulate the results, and, at best, have varied perspectives that nega-
tively impact certain vulnerable populations.381 Furthermore, judges and other 
decision makers in the criminal justice system may vary in when and how they 
choose to use a risk assessment and its’ results in their judgments.382 Conse-
quently, even if the tools are found to be objective, when they are not used in 
an objective manner, marginalized communities remain stuck in the margins. 
Although risk assessment tools may replace arbitrary or discriminatory de-
cision-making in the pretrial release and bail setting process with a more sys-
tematic method grounded in evidence, they also have the power to disparately 
impact communities of color.383 In the context of actuarial risk assessment in 
the sentencing context, former Attorney General Eric Holder stated that, “[b]y 
                                                        
377  Id. at 22. 
378  See Julia Angwin and Jeff Larson, Bias in Criminal Risk Scores is Mathematically Inevi-
table, Researchers Say, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 30, 2016, 4:44 PM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/bias-in-criminal-risk-scores-is-mathematically-inevitable-
researchers-say [https://perma.cc/8CR2-2UXF]; Jennifer L. Doleac & Megan Stevenson, Are 
Criminal Risk Assessment Scores Racist?, BROOKINGS (Aug. 22, 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2016/08/22/are-criminal-risk-assessment-scores-
racist/ [https://perma.cc/AWU4-TBMG]; George Joseph, Justice by Algorithm, CITYLAB 
(Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/12/justice-by-algorithm/505514/ 
[https://perma.cc/BJ8C-UX4W]; discussion supra Section II.B.i. 
379  See Matt Watkins, The Most Hot-Button Issue in Criminal Justice Reform?, CTR. FOR CT. 
INNOVATION (Oct. 2018), https://www.courtinnovation.org/publications/risk-assessment-
podcast [https://perma.cc/AY55-H6LU]; see, e.g., Michael Tonry, Legal and Ethical Issues 
in the Prediction of Recidivism, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 167, 173 (2014) (concluding that reli-
ance on criminal histories intertwined with socioeconomic factors, such as age at time of 
first arrest, custody status at time of first arrest, and total number of convictions, inherently 
disadvantage minority defendants).  
380  See id.; discussion supra Section II.B.i. 
381  Sonja B. Starr, Risk Assessment Era: An Overdue Debate, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 205, 206 
(2015). 
382  Id. 
383  MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 10, at 22. 
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basing sentencing decisions on static factors and immutable characteristics—
like the defendant’s education level, socioeconomic background, or neighbor-
hood—they may exacerbate unwarranted and unjust disparities that are already 
far too common in our criminal justice system and in our society.”384 Accord-
ingly, risk assessment tools may not fix the biases and disparities inherit in the 
cash bail system, but rather they may make existing racial and socioeconomic 
disparities even worse by giving scientific credibility to unequal outcomes.385 
In her article “Assessing Risk Assessment in Action,” Professor Megan 
Stevenson identified problems with using a risk assessment tool to accomplish 
goals in pretrial decisions.386 The problems included: the imperfect methods of 
measuring human predictions, the “implausible assumption that the human’s 
objective” is the same as the algorithm’s, and an inability to measure accuracy 
because of the many variables within individual outcomes.387 The problems 
highlight how data based on algorithmic versus judges’ results can be skewed 
and depend on subjective goals.388 For example, if a judge sets bail, a defendant 
who cannot pay merely goes to jail and is then lost as a data point in determin-
ing if the algorithm would have accurately predicted the result.389 Professor 
Stevenson highlighted that testing algorithmic assessments is not like a race, 
with a clear winner.390 Ideally, the best alternative to algorithmic risk assess-
ments would be to test the predictions of a human versus the prediction made 
by the algorithm.391 This failure to account for the “human” element of a de-
sired outcome can cause statistical issues. 
Many jurisdictions today are looking to fix the racial biases and disparities 
in the cash bail system, though the tools being used to fix such problems may 
not only continue the problems, but make them worse.392 Turning from arbi-
trary decision-making that marginalizes minority and impoverished communi-
ties to tools supported by flawed science is not the way to fix disparities in the 
pretrial release and bail setting process.393 Ultimately, more research is neces-
sary to determine the tool’s effectiveness and whether its use further perpetu-
ates the biases and disparities at the center of our country’s broken criminal jus-
tice system. 
                                                        
384  Atty. Gen. Eric Holder, Address at National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
57th Annual Meeting (Aug. 1, 2014), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-national-
association-criminal-defense-lawyers-57th [https://perma.cc/8H27-4HK9]. 
385  MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 10, at 22. 
386  Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINNESOTA L. REV. 303, 
324 (2018). 
387  Id. at 324–25. 
388  Id. at 323. 
389  Id. 
390  Id. at 322. 
391  Id. 
392  MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 10, at 22. 
393  Watkins, supra note 379. 
3 NEV. L.J. FORUM 9 5/7/2019  10:51 AM 
Spring 2019] TO BAIL OR NOT TO BAIL 53 
 
IV. NEVADA 
“In Nevada, the criminal justice system has too often not been a system of cor-
rections so much as a system of incarceration, without doing much . . . to cor-
rect the drivers of criminal behavior. Instead of trying to solve the problem, the 
approach has more often been to warehouse an offender—out of sight, out of 
mind.”394 
Notwithstanding a strong bipartisan movement at all levels to undo mass 
incarceration, the United States continues to have the highest incarceration rate 
and overall number of people incarcerated in the world.395 Nonetheless, by the 
end of 2016, the United States reached the lowest incarceration rate in the last 
two decades.396 This decrease, however, is not reflected in state incarceration 
rates, as demonstrated by the expansion of Nevada’s carceral state.397 Despite 
the 7 percent decrease in the national rate of incarceration, Nevada’s incarcera-
tion rate suffered from a 7 percent increase.398 Moreover, Nevada incarcerates 
more people on average than other states,399 resulting in an “imprisonment rate 
that is 15 percent higher than the national average.”400 The incarceration rate 
forces the state to house nearly 200 inmates in an Arizona prison.401 In the past 
decade, the state female imprisonment rate generated specific concerns because 
                                                        
394  Hearing on Assemb. B. 236 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 2019 Leg., 80th 
Sess. (Nev. 2019) (Statement of Steve Yeager, Chair, Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary), 
http://nvleg.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=11041 [https://perma.cc/J4PL-MNDZ].  
395  The US “incarcerates a larger share of its population than any other country.” John 
Gramlich, America’s Incarceration Rate is at a Two-Decade Low, PEW RES. CTR. (May 2, 
2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/02/americas-incarceration-rate-is-at-a-
two-decade-low/ [https://perma.cc/L4XN-YRZ4]; see discussion Section I. 
396  Id. “At the end of 2016, there were about 2.2 million people behind bars in the U.S., in-
cluding 1.5 million under the jurisdiction of federal and state prisons and roughly 741,000 in 
the custody of locally run jails.” Id. The sharp decrease in the incarceration rate, which ac-
counts for the population change, is accompanied by the decrease in the number of inmates 
in recent years. Id. 
397  Lucas Thomas, Nevada’s Incarceration Rate Among Highest In The Country, 
PATCH.COM (Jan. 18, 2018, 5:44 PM), https://patch.com/nevada/lasvegas/nevadas-
incarceration-rate-among-highest-country [https://perma.cc/QE67-MBFD]. Importantly, of 
the over 1.5 million people behind bars, the states incarcerated 1,316,205 people (87.4% of 
the number of incarcerated people in the US), whereas the federal system only incarcerated 
189,192 people (12.6% of the number of incarcerated people in the US). Id. 
398  Michael Lyle, Criminal Justice Reform Long Overdue in Nevada, Ford Says, NEV. 
CURRENT (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.nevadacurrent.com/2018/11/12/criminal-justice-
reform-long-overdue-in-nevada-ford-says/ [https://perma.cc/N974-9ZE2].  
399  Michelle Rindels, Can Better Data Help Keep Prison Population Down? Nevada’s Go-
ing to Try, NEV. INDEPENDENT (Aug. 12, 2018, 2:05 AM), 
https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/can-better-data-help-keep-prison-population-
down-nevadas-going-to-try [https://perma.cc/C4XU-8K9M]. 
400  Id.; see also JRI FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 4. 
401  Rindels, supra note 399.  
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it has grown at “four times the pace of the overall prison population.”402 Over-
all, these notable areas of growth will contribute to 15 percent of the overall 
growth of the incarcerated population over the next decade.403 Over the next ten 
years, Nevada’s incarcerated population is expected to grow by 1,197 beds.404 
That growth is “estimated to cost the state an additional $770 million in capital 
expenditures to build or lease new prisons and added operating costs.”405 Thus, 
while many states have seen significant decreases in incarcerated populations, 
crimes rates, and costs, Nevada has not—and will not—follow suit without sig-
nificant criminal justice reform.  
In 2018, the substantial costs attached to the growing incarcerated popula-
tion in Nevada raised concerns because of the 20 percent increase in yearly 
spending since 2012, and the sharp increase in correctional officer overtime 
costs, “prompting the state to dip into reserves and eating up money that’s 
meant to be available to a variety of agencies.”406 In response, former Governor 
Brian Sandoval announced a comprehensive review of Nevada’s criminal jus-
tice system in partnership with the Crime and Justice Institute (CJI).407 In Janu-
ary 2019, the Advisory Commission on the Administrative of Justice (ACAJ) 
released its final report which connected the bulk of the growth in Nevada’s 
correctional facilities to the rise in the number of individuals incarcerated for 
probation and parole violations, and the at least two-thirds of the population 
that entered the system for a nonviolent offense.408 Overall, the alarming 
growth of Nevada’s incarcerated population increased the annual corrections 
budget “14 percent in the last decade, reaching $347 million in the current fis-
cal year.”409 As a result of their key findings, the ACAJ included twenty-five 
policy recommendations “specifically designed to improve public safety by 
holding offenders accountable, reducing recidivism, and increasing the re-
sources available to combat the state’s behavioral health crisis” and control 
population growth and corrections costs for consideration by the Nevada Legis-
lature.410 Noticeably absent from the ACAJ’s recommendations and proposed 
                                                        
402  JRI FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 4. KNPR News Staff, Report: Nevada Prison Popu-
lation Above Average and Growing, NEV. PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 13, 2018), 
https://knpr.org/headline/2018-09/report-nevada-prison-population-above-average-and-
growing [https://perma.cc/SKR4-N6FH]. 
403  JRI FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 4.  
404  Id. 
405  Id.  
406  Rindels, supra note 399. 
407  Id.; see also Kinner, supra note 1. 
408  Yeager, supra note 2. 
409  Id.  
410  The 25 policy recommendations provided by the ACAJ are:  
1. Establish [crisis intervention training] requirements for law enforcement officers  . . . . 
2. Establish pre-prosecution diversion for first-time nonviolent felony offenders  . . . . 
3. Remove existing barriers to presumptive probations  . . . . 
4. Establish a presumption of sentence deferral for certain nonviolent offenders admitted to Spe-
cialty Court  . . . . 
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legislation are any changes specifically relating to bail and preventative deten-
tion, despite these issues being at the center of criminal justice reform conver-
sations in Nevada in recent years.411 
A. Nevada’s Cash Bail System  
Nevada’s cash bail system is defined by some of the most detailed and 
comprehensive statutes in the country, which are primarily based on the basic 
principles of the commercial bail industry.412 Similar to the Eighth Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution,413 the Nevada Constitution prohibits excessive bail.414 
Specifically, the state’s constitution provides that “[a]ll persons shall be baila-
ble by sufficient sureties; unless for Capital Offenses or murders punishable by 
life imprisonment without possibility of parole when the proof is evident or the 
                                                                                                                                
5. Ensure Drug and Mental Health Court programs align with best practices  . . . . 
6. Amend the burglary statute to correspond to different levels of conduct and create proportion-
al penalties  . . . . 
7. Increase the felony theft threshold, establish different sentencing tiers for high-level larcenies, 
and ensure theft threshold amounts are consistent across all related offenses  . . . . 
8. Reclassify simple possession of a controlled substance  . . . . 
9. Increase judicial discretion in sentencing for commercial drug offenses  . . . . 
10. Amend trafficking weights to distinguish drug sellers from drug traffickers, and require evi-
dence of intent to sell or manufacture  . . . . 
11. Establish a lookback period for the habitual criminal statute  . . . . 
12. Remove the sentencing recommendation from the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report  . . . . 
13. Reclassify certain nonviolent Category B offenses to tailor criminal conduct more appropri-
ately to the corresponding penalty  . . . . 
14. Establish and codify a streamlined parole process  . . . . 
15. Implement a specialty parole option for long-term, geriatric inmates  . . . . 
16. Reduce the maximum probation period that can be ordered  . . . . 
17. Expand the use of swift, certain, and proportional sanctions  . . . . 
18. Limit the period of incarceration resulting from a revocation for technical violations  . . . . 
19. Strengthen supervision decision-making  . . . . 
20. Expanding and systemizing reentry  . . . . 
21. Establish policies and practices to guide decision-making that address gender specific needs 
 . . . . 
22. Ensure sustainability of policy changes and adherence to best practices  . . . . 
23. Require a certain percentage of funds be dedicated to expanding the options available to law 
enforcement when responding to individuals with behavioral health needs  . . . . 
24. Reinvest in community supervision, treatment, and transitional housing  . . . . and 
25. Reinvest in victims’ services  . . . . 
JRI FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5, 21–36; Kinner, supra note 1.  
411  See discussion infra Part IV.  
412  Hayley E. Miller, Note, Taming the Wild West: Using Unsecured Bail Bonds in Nevada’s 
Pretrial-Release Program, 16 NEV. L.J. 1239, 1245–46 (2016). 
413  U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see also Kaczmarek v. State, 91 P.3d 16, 33–34 (Nev. 2004). 
414  NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 6. 
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presumption great.”415 Thus, a defendant has the right to reasonable bail, except 
when charged with capital murder or murders punishable by life in prison.416 
In addition to constitutional provisions, Nevada statutes give the courts the 
authority, in certain circumstances, to release an accused person pending trial 
or sentencing.417 Statutory limitations exist under Nevada law regarding the 
right to bail before conviction.418 Before the release of “a person arrested for 
any crime, the court may impose such reasonable conditions on the person as it 
deems necessary to protect the health, safety and welfare of the community and 
to ensure that the person will appear at all times and places ordered by the 
court.”419 Moreover, NRS § 178.4853 requires the court to consider a number 
of factors in determining whether pretrial release without bail may be warrant-
ed, which include: 
1. The length of residence in the community; 
2. The status and history of employment; 
3. Relationships with the person’s spouse and children, parents or other family 
members and with close friends; 
4. Reputation, character and mental condition; 
5. Prior criminal record, including, without limitation, any record of appearing 
or failing to appear after release on bail or without bail; 
6. The identity or responsible members of the community who would vouch for 
the reliability of the person; 
7. The nature of the offense with which the person is charged, the apparent 
probability of conviction and the likely sentence, insofar as these factors relate 
to the risk of not appearing; 
8. The nature and seriousness of the danger to the alleged victim, any other per-
son or the community that would be posed by the person’s release;  
9. The likelihood of more criminal activity by the person after release; and 
10. Any other factors concerning the person’s ties to the community or bearing 
on the risk that the person may willfully fail to appear.420 
Moreover, Nevada statutes provide a non-comprehensive list of the condi-
tions a judge may impose on the defendant, such as requiring the defendant to 
remain in Nevada or within a particular county, prohibiting the defendant from 
contact with specific people, prohibiting the defendant from entering a particu-
lar area (e.g., the Las Vegas strip) and from engaging in conduct that “may be 
harmful to the person’s own health, safety or welfare, or the health, safety or 
welfare of another person.”421 Ultimately, the decision to increase or lower bail 
and impose conditions on pretrial release lies within the discretion of the court, 
whose primary concerns are to protect the public health, safety and welfare, and 
                                                        
415  NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 7. 
416  Id. 
417  NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 178.4851, 178.4853 (2019).  
418  NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.484 (2019). 
419  NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.484(11) (2019).  
420  NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.4853.  
421  NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.484(11)(d). 
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ensure a person’s return to court as mandated by a judge.422 For example, Ne-
vada’s Second Judicial District Court, which serves Washoe County, supple-
ments the statutory provision with fourteen conditions on release a judge can 
impose.423 Whereas, the state’s Eighth Judicial District Court, which serves 
Clark County and is home to Nevada’s largest metropolitan city, Las Vegas, 
does not provide additional guidance to judges in this area.424 Despite statutory 
guidance for setting bail and conditions on release, counties across the state 
have adopted other tools including bail schedules and pretrial risk assessments 
to allow for, at the very least, uniform bail setting practices at the county level.  
1. Bail Schedules 
Some of Nevada’s counties join the nearly 64 percent of counties across 
the United States that use bail schedules.425 However, the use of these sched-
ules causes bail regimes to vastly differ throughout the state. For example, in 
Clark County, the Las Vegas Justice Court has implemented a bail schedule 
which provides standardized bail amounts for various categories of felony of-
fenses, gross misdemeanors, misdemeanors, and violations of protective or-
ders.426 Nevada statutes also impose additional bail for crime enhancements, 
which include:427 
1. “Felony committed on property of school, at activity sponsored by 
school or on school bus;”428  
2. “Felony committed by adult with assistance of child;”429 
3. “Use of handgun with metal-penetrating bullet in [the] commission of 
crime;”430  
4. “Use of deadly weapon or tear gas in commission of crime;”431 
5. “Felony committed in violation of order for protection or order to re-
strict conduct;”432  
                                                        
422  NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.484(11). 
423  CRIM. R. PRAC. SECOND JUD. CT. ST. NEV. 5. 
424  See R. PRAC. EIGHTH JUD. CT. ST. NEV.  
425  Carlson, supra note 349.  
426  JUSTICE COURT, LAS VEGAS TWP., STANDARD BAIL SCHEDULE, (2015), 
https://www.clarkcountybar.org/wp-content/uploads/lvjcsbs15.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7ZL-
LXT4] [hereinafter STANDARD BAIL SCHEDULE]. For an Example of Clark County’s Bail 
Schedule see Appendix, tbl.A.8. 
427  Id.; see also NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 193.161 (school property), 193.162 (assistance of 
child), 193.163 (handgun containing metal-penetrating bullets), 193.165 (use of deadly 
weapon), 193.166 (felony in violation of protection order), 193.167 (60 or older/vulnerable 
person), 193.1675 (characteristics of victim), 193.168 (gang), 193.1685 (terrorism), 
453.3335, 453.3345, 453.3351, or 453.3353 (certain violations involving controlled sub-
stances under certain circumstances).  
428  NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.161. 
429  NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.162. 
430  NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.163. 
431  NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.165. 
432  NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.166. 
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6. “Certain crimes committed against person 60 years of age or older or 
against vulnerable person;”433  
7. “Commission of a crime because of certain actual or perceived charac-
teristics of victim;”434 
8. “Felony committed to promote activities of criminal gang;”435  
9. “Felony committed with intent to commit, cause, aid, further or con-
ceal act of terrorism”;436 
10. Certain violations involving “controlled substances under certain cir-
cumstances”437 
While any person in Nevada charged with the aforementioned is subject to 
additional penalties pursuant to Nevada law, the Las Vegas Township Justice 
Court standard bail schedule provides that when the listed enhancements are 
added to a charged offense, the standard bail amount doubles.438  
Clark County’s bail schedule differs significantly from the bail schedule 
implemented in Churchill County, which is one of the state’s fifteen rural coun-
ties. The Churchill County bail schedule provides standardized bail amounts for 
over one hundred violations, including traffic violations, with bail ranging from 
$25.00 for “position of driver’s hands” to $250,000 for “sexual assault—
(Forcible/Substantial Bodily Harm).”439 Previously, the Second Judicial District 
Court used a bail schedule to set bail for those arrested in Washoe County, Ne-
vada.440 However, when the County became part of the Pretrial Risk Assess-
ment Tool Pilot Program, its use was suspended.441  
As demonstrated, the possible bail amount a defendant will pay is contin-
gent on where in the state the charged offense is committed. Without a bail 
schedule to rely on, judges may use their discretion, as authorized under Neva-
da law, to determine the appropriate amount to assign to a defendant. Because 
of the concern that the lack of uniformity in setting bail resulted in various out-
comes and notable disparities, Nevada implemented an evidence-based release 
system using a pretrial risk assessment tool to create an avenue for more con-
sistent bail setting practices throughout the state. 
                                                        
433  NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.167. 
434  NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.1675. 
435  NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.168. 
436  NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.1685. 
437  NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 453.3335, 453.3345, 453.3351, 453.3353.  
438  STANDARD BAIL SCHEDULE, supra note 426. 
439  CHURCHILL CTY., BAIL SCHEDULE, (2013), 
http://www.churchillcounty.org/documentcenter/view/3022 [https://perma.cc/HEU2-
LCMT]. 




441  See Admin. Order 2016-15, In re Admin. Matter of Rescinding Washoe Cty. Unif. Bail 
Schedule (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.washoecourts.com/AdminOrders/PDF/2016/2016-
15%20ADMINISTRATIVE%20MATTER%20OF%20RESCINDING%20WASHOE%20C
OUNTY%20UNIFORM%20BAIL%20SCHEDULE.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BDY-LC77]. 
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2. Nevada’s Pretrial Risk Assessment Tool 
In 2015, in response to the concern surrounding the inconsistency in the 
state’s bail setting practices, Justice James W. Hardesty of the Supreme Court 
of Nevada convened a committee to study and explore alternatives and im-
provements to Nevada’s pretrial release system.442 Over several meetings, the 
Committee to Study Evidence Based Pretrial Release was informed about vari-
ous pretrial assessment tools used in jurisdictions across the country including 
the Ohio Risk Assessment System (ORAS).443 After review of the tools pre-
sented and its own research, the Committee decided it would customize a pre-
trial risk tool incorporating “all of the positive attributes” of the instruments re-
viewed.444 In February 2016, the Committee presented a prototype tool called 
the Nevada Pretrial Risk (NPR) instrument.445 After taking constructive rec-
ommendations from Committee members, the NPR tool’s initial set of risk fac-
tors included the following: 
1. Existing pending criminal case at time of current offense;  
2. Age at first arrest (adult or juvenile);  
3. Prior misdemeanor arrests;  
4. Prior felony or gross misdemeanor arrests;  
5. Prior arrest for violent crimes; 
6. Prior FTA’s past two years;  
7. Current employment status;  
8. Current residency; and,  
9. Indications of substance abuse.446 
“The weights for each of the nine scoring items and the overall risk scale 
were based on prior studies of other similar risk instruments,” specifically 
ORAS, with the expectation that modifications to the weight and scale for fac-
tors would happen after data collection and analysis.447 By the end of the 
month, the tool was ready to be tested on a random sample of defendants re-
leased in 2014 from the Washoe County Detention Facility, all defendants re-
leased in White Pine County, and two random samples of defendants from the 
Clark County Detention Center or the Las Vegas City Jail.448 
The Committee assigned five primary goals for the NPR’s pilot test: 
1. Description of the types of people currently being released in pretrial status in 
terms of their demographics, offense, and criminal history; 
2. The methods of release and time in custody prior to release; 
3. Re-arrest and Failure to Appear (FTA) rates; 
4. Testing of the prototype instrument in terms of its validity; and, 
                                                        
442  AUSTIN & ALLEN, supra note 5, at 1. 
443  Id.  
444  Id.  
445  Id.  
446  Id. at 1–2. 
447  Id.  
448  Id.  
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5. Methods for improving the NPR predictive qualities.449 
Two key dependent variables were recorded on a total of 1,057 collected 
from the four jurisdictions: (1) “whether the released defendant was rearrested 
for a new crime” and (2) “whether there was a bench warrant issued for failing 
to appear . . . for any scheduled court hearing.”450 These two variables deter-
mined “if the scoring items that were contained on the proto-type NPR instru-
ment were statistically associated with either the rate of re-arrest or [failure to 
appear].”451 Throughout testing, the prototype tool was adjusted as follows: 
1. Added the factor of possession of valid cell phone number . . . ; 
2. Consolidated the substance abuse factor by only using prior drug/alcohol re-
lated arrests . . . ; 
3. Modified the residence factor by adding whether the person was a resident of 
Nevada . . . ; 
4. Consolidated prior misdemeanor arrest score so that 3 or more receive 2 
points . . . ; 
5. Consolidated prior felony/gross misdemeanor arrests score so that 2 or more 
are scored as 2 points . . . ; and, 
6. Re-calibrated the overall scale so that it matches the new scoring process.452 
Based on the results of the pilot test, it was determined that the prototype 
was “proven to be a statistically valid pretrial risk instrument that meets indus-
try standards in terms of the factors being used and their overall predictive ac-
curacy” and ready to be fully implemented in the sampled jurisdictions.453 Sub-
sequently, the Committee produced two additional versions of the tool where it 
changed several items from the 2016 version, one tested in Washoe County and 
White Pine, and the other in Clark County.454 These changes included rescaling 
risk factors, adjusting point assignments for certain factors, and adding mitigat-
ing verified stability factors.455 
Approximately a year following the implementation of the NPR in four ju-
risdictions in Nevada, the Pretrial Justice Institute published, “The State of Pre-
trial Justice in America” in November 2017.456 The report was a comprehensive 
study of pretrial systems across the country, including a review of whether the 
                                                        
449  Id.  
450  Id. at 3. 
451  Id. at 4. 
452  Id. at 5–6. 
453  Id. at 6.  
454  See Committee to Study Evidence-Based Pretrial Release Meeting Recordings, SUP. CT. 
NEV. (July 19, 2017), available at 
https://nvcourts.gov/AOC/Committees_and_Commissions/Evidence/Meeting_Recordings/ 
[https://perma.cc/A7EB-GDBZ] [hereinafter Committee to Study Evidence-Based Pretrial 
Release]. 
455  See id.  
456  See PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., supra note 290. 
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NPR was producing positive results.457 To arrive at the grade, the report’s anal-
ysis focused on three measures:458  
1. Rate of unconvicted people in local jails; 
2. Percentage of people living in a jurisdiction that uses evidence-based pretrial 
assessment to inform pretrial decisions, and 
3. Percent of a state’s population living in a jurisdiction that has functionally 
eliminated secured money bail. 
The report indicates that Nevada has a pretrial detention rate (rate of un-
convicted people in local jails) of 17.9 per 10,000 residents.459 Moreover, 
89.1% percent of people live in a county that uses the NPR.460 An analysis of 
the three measures resulted in Nevada being one of nine states to receive a “B” 
grade.461 This result suggests that, at least in the jurisdictions using the NPR, 
Nevada seemingly took a step in the right direction to improve its pretrial sys-
tem. Since its implementation in 2016, the four selected jurisdictions continue 
to use and collect data from the use of the modified NPR to provide a follow-up 
report at the end of 2019.462 
In the end, regardless of the process or tool used to set bail, a defendant 
who can afford bail pays cash or credit to the court, an amount that is later re-
turned to the defendant provided they appear in court.463 In the case that a de-
fendant cannot pay, a bail-bond company may post bail and assure the court 
that the defendant will appear.464 Pursuant to NRS 697.300, bail bondsmen 
must charge either “15 percent of the amount of the of bond or $50, whichever 
is greater,” plus administrative fees.465 Typically, the defendant provides co-
signers and collateral to cover the liability of a failure to appear.466 Release 
from preventative detention occurs once the bond posts and is later returned to 
the company provided the defendant appears in court as assured by the bond.467 
B. An Examination of Recent Bail Reform Efforts in Nevada 
In comparison to the majority of states, Nevada has been slow to join the 
criminal justice reform movement. The first significant step occurred in 2015, 
when Justice Hardesty led the “Committee to Study Evidence Based Pretrial 
                                                        
457  Id. 
458  Id. at 6.  
459  Id. at app.  
460  Id.  
461  Id. at 12–13. Notably, California received a “D.” Id. 
462  See generally Committee to Study Evidence-Based Pretrial Release, supra note 454. 
463  NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.502(2)(b) (2019). 
464  See F. Andre Taylor, Bail Bondsmen Sometimes Get Bad Rap, LAS VEGAS REV. J. (July 
15, 2014, 3:00 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/life/public-safety/bail-bondsmen-
sometimes-get-bad-rap [https://perma.cc/QR2F-EG8J].  
465  NEV. REV. STAT. § 697.300(1)(a) (2019).  
466  MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 10, at 12. 
467  Taylor, supra note 464. 
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Release,” as discussed above, to examine alternatives to the state’s varying bail 
setting practices.468 In the years following, the state has seen other efforts to re-
form pretrial services as it pertains to preventative detention and cash bail.  
1. 2017 Legislative Efforts: Nevada’s “Elimination of Cash Bail” Bill 
During the 2017 Legislative Session, state legislators introduced bills to 
address the deficiencies of the state’s criminal justice system.469 Among those 
was Assembly Bill 136 (AB 136), introduced by Assemblywoman Dina Neal, 
which would have mandated a court to consider the imposition of “non-
financial conditions . . . on a person to mitigate the risk of failure to appear or 
the risk to public safety.”470 Additionally, the bill “authorized the court to use 
an evidence-based risk assessment tool in deciding whether there is good cause 
to release a person without bail.”471 However, Gov. Sandoval vetoed Assem-
blywoman Neal’s bill stating it would “incorporate a new and unproven method 
for determining whether a criminal defendant should be released from custody 
without posting bail.”472 Assemblywoman Neal’s bill was a significant step in 
Nevada’s efforts to fight the money bail system, despite its demise on the Gov-
ernor’s desk. 
2. 2019 Legislative and Judicial Bail Reform Efforts 
In November 2018, Nevadan’s voted for former Clark County Commis-
sioner Steve Sisolak to become the state’s thirtieth Governor; the first Demo-
cratic governor in Nevada in two decades.473 On the campaign trail, Sisolak 
signaled support for legislative efforts to reform the cash bail system474 by out-
                                                        
468  See Discussion Section IV.A.2.  
469  See Assemb. B. 38, 136, 250, 2017 Leg., 79th Legis. Sess. (Nev. 2017); S.B. 18 & 82, 
2019 Leg., 79th Legis. Sess. (Nev. 2017). Texts of bills proposed during the 79th Legislative 
Session are available at https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/79th2017/Bills/List 
[https://perma.cc/C72S-FLYF]. 
470  Megan Messerly et al., On Deadline Day, Lawmakers Pass Bills on Cyber Security, 
Heath Care and Campaign Finance, NEV. INDEP. (May 17, 2017, 2:15 AM), 
https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/on-deadline-day-lawmakers-pass-bills-on-cyber-
security-health-care-and-campaign-finance/ [https://perma.cc/W3QS-DRL9].  
471  Id. 
472  Letter from Brian Sandoval, Governor of Nevada, to Jason Frierson, Speaker of Nevada 
State Assembly (May 26, 2017), available at 
http://gov.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/govnvgov/Content/News_and_Media/Press/2017_Images_a
nd_Files/2017-05-28_AB136VetoMay26.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL6T-HRT4]. 
473  Michelle Rindels et al., IndyTalks: Full Transcript of Steve Sisolak’s Interview with the 
Nevada Independent, NEV. INDEP. (Jan. 29, 2019, 2:05 AM), 
https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/indytalks-full-transcript-of-steve-sisolaks-
interview-with-the-nevada-independent [https://perma.cc/T79M-T3MJ].  
474  Michael Lyle, Sisolak and Holder Discuss Justice Reform with Activists, NEV. CURRENT 
(Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.nevadacurrent.com/2018/09/07/sisolak-and-holder-discuss-
justice-reform-with-activists/ [https://perma.cc/VK5X-BZCG]. 
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wardly supporting ending cash bail shortly after taking office in January 
2019.475 
a. Legislative Bail Reform Proposals 
After months of research and assessment of the state’s criminal justice sys-
tem, on March 8, 2019, Assemblyman Steve Yeager and Justice Hardesty pre-
sented a 136-page bill to the Judiciary Committee of the 80th Session of the 
Nevada Legislature, Assembly Bill No. 236 (AB 236), which encompasses all 
recommendations made by the ACAJ.476 In a presentation submitted to the 
Committee, Assemblyman Yeager asserted that the enactment of all recom-
mendations included in the bill would result in the state saving nearly “$640 
million dollars by averting nearly 90 percent of the state’s prison population 
growth.” As proposed, the bill has essentially “pitted prosecutors against public 
defenders.”477 Proponents assert the bill provides necessary changes to an anti-
quated criminal justice system by investing in transition services for offenders 
re-entering society, and has the goal of curbing a growing carceral population 
and lower the recidivism rates.478 Opponents argue the bill compromises public 
safety and are concerned about lesser punishment for certain crimes, particular-
ly for habitual criminals, and “allow[ing] offenders who violate certain parts of 
their probation to avoid having their probation revoked.”479 There is additional-
ly a concern that the proposed legislation is ambitious, attempting to go too far, 
too fast.480 AB 236 is being described as the “single most important and trans-
formative” criminal justice legislation in the state’s history, and thus likely to 
require significant effort by the legislative body to arrive at a proposal for crim-
inal justice reform that gets all parties on board.481  
Even in its formal presentation to the legislative body, AB 236 was not in-
clusive of significant reform to preventative detention or bail setting practices 
in the state as a result of the omission of such recommendations on behalf of 
the ACAJ. However, legislators in the Nevada Assembly have proposed vari-
ous measure that focus on significant bail reform, one with the particular goal 
of eliminating the cash bail system entirely. Unless otherwise specified by the 
                                                        
475  Rindels et al., supra note 473. 
476  A.B. 236—Makes Various Changes Related to Criminal Law and Procedure, supra note 
394; Ryan Tarinelli, Nevada Criminal Justice Reform Bill Heard by Lawmakers, LAS VEGAS 
SUN (Mar. 8, 2019, 2:17 PM), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2019/mar/08/nevada-
lawmakers-spar-on-criminal-justice-reform-b/ [https://perma.cc/ZD5X-KAKD].  
477  Tarinelli, supra note 476. 
478  Id. 
479  Id. 
480  Id. 
481  Id. 
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language of the bill, if passed and signed by the Governor, the legislation speci-
fied below will take effect on October 1, 2019.482  
i. Assembly Bill 17 
Hoping to continue the fight from the previous legislative session, the 
Committee on Judiciary, on behalf of the Nevada Supreme Court, introduced 
Assembly Bill No. 17 (AB 17) in the 2019 State of Nevada Legislature on Feb-
ruary 4, 2019.483 This bill proposes changes to how posted bail is considered in 
criminal and civil court proceedings by eliminating portions of the law that al-
low courts to avoid exonerating bail within thirty days of bail being posted.484 
Instead, the bill requires a court to exonerate bail “if the charges against a de-
fendant are dismissed or if no normal action is taken against a defendant.”485 
Moreover, it amends a “section of law allowing the court to keep the bail and 
apply it again if a defendant is charged with another offense ‘arising out of the 
same act.’ ”486 On April 15, 2019, the bill adopted Amendment 35, which gives 
the court discretion to “delay exoneration of the bail for a period not to exceed 
30 days under certain circumstances.”487 On April 16, 2019, the Assembly 
Committee on Judiciary passed AB 17, as amended, and sent the bill to the 
Senate.488 
ii. Assembly Bill 125 
On February 11, 2019, Assemblywoman Dina Neal and Assemblymen Ed-
gar Flores and William McCurdy introduced Assembly Bill No. 125 (AB 
125).489 This bill revises “provisions governing factors to be considered by the 
court in deciding whether to release a person without bail; prohibiting a court 
                                                        
482  Lorne Malkiewich & Allison Combs, How a Bill Becomes a Law —Process, Presenta-
tion at Presession Academy for New Legislators 2011 (Jan. 19, 2011), available at 
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/LegInfo/Orientation/2010-
11/Handouts/Jan19-24/1-19/08NVLegislativeProcess.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EKD-DTXN]. 
483  Assemb. B. 17: Overview. 2019 Leg., 80th Legis. Sess. (Nev. 2019), 
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/80th2019/Bill/5903/Overview 
[https://perma.cc/6YHN-5WGB]. 
484  Michelle Rindels, et al., 2-Minute Preview: Legislature Still Dealing with Gun Back-
ground Checks, But Voting Rights and Antlers, Too, NEV. INDEP. (Feb. 13, 2019, 2:13 AM), 
https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/2-minute-preview-legislature-still-dealing-with-
gun-background-checks-but-voting-rights-and-antlers-too [https://perma.cc/RH74-LDUJ].  
485  Id.  
486  Id.  
487  2019 LEG., 80TH LEGIS. SESS., ASSEMBLY AMENDMENT TO ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 17, (Nev. 
Apr. 8, 2019), 
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/80th2019/Bills/Amendments/A_AB17_35.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9F28-S738]. 
488  Assemb. B. 17: Overview, 2019 Leg., 80th Legis. Sess. (Nev. 2019), 
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/80th2019/Bill/5903/Overview 
[https://perma.cc/6YHN-5WGB]. 
489  Assemb. B. 125, 2019 Leg., 80th Legis. Sess. (Nev. 2019). 
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from relying solely on a bail schedule in setting the amount of bail after a per-
sonal appearance by a defendant.”490 Specifically, when a court decides wheth-
er to release a person with bail, it “may use an evidence-based risk assessment 
tool, if available, but at a minimum shall consider” factors enumerated under 
NRS § 178.4853.491 The bill adds the following to the existing law’s non-
comprehensive list:  
Whether one or more conditions can be imposed on the person to miti-
gate the risk of failure to appear or the risk to public safety, including, 
without limitation: 
(a) Restrictions on residence or travel; 
(b) Restrictions on associations, including, without limitation, requiring 
the person to avoid contact with alleged victims or potential witnesses; 
(c) Requiring the person to maintain or actively seek employment; 
(d) Requiring the person to regularly report to a designated law en-
forcement agency or the court; 
(e) Imposing a curfew; 
(f) Prohibiting the possession of a firearm; 
(g) Prohibiting the use of alcohol and controlled substances; 
(h) Requiring the person to receive medical, psychiatric or psychological 
treatment, including, without limitation, treatment for alcohol or drug 
abuse or a mental illness; 
(i) Intensive supervision of the person; or 
(j) Any other condition reasonably necessary to ensure the appearance of 
the person or the safety of any person in the community.  
Moreover, the bill seeks to amend NRS § 178.498 by providing that after a 
person “has personally appeared before the magistrate, the magistrate may not 
rely solely on a standardized bail schedule to set the amount of bail.”492 On 
April 12, 2019, Senate Majority Leader Nicole J. Cannizzaro and Speaker of 
the Assembly Jason Frierson granted the waiver requested by the Assembly 
Committee on Judiciary.493 
iii. Assembly Bill 203 
On March 4, 2019, the Assembly Judiciary introduced Assembly Bill No. 
203 (AB 203), which seeks to amend NRS Chapter 178 to provide that:  
If . . . a defendant can be admitted to bail without appearing personally 
before a magistrate, the defendant must be admitted to bail on an unse-
cured bond if the defendant:  
Was arrested for:  
(1) A misdemeanor; or 
(2) A gross misdemeanor which does not involve an act of violence; 
                                                        
490  Id. 
491  See discussion supra Section IV.A. 
492  Assemb. B. 203, 2019 Leg. 80th Legis. Sess. (Nev. 2019) (emphasis added).  
493  ASSEMB. DAILY JOURNAL 2019 LEG., 80TH LEGIS. SESS. 3 (Nev. Apr. 15, 2019), 
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/80th2019/Journal/Assembly/Final/aj071.pdf 
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(b) Was not arrested while on bail; and  
(c) Does not have a record of failing to appear after release on bail or 
without bail.494  
Concerns about the comprehensiveness of this proposed legislation arose 
shortly after its introduction. Supporters of cash bail reform worry that the bill 
will “leave too many loopholes for the district attorney, the police department, 
or . . . law enforcement in general . . . to overcharge people.”495 For example, 
some worry that if the law is implemented, those held on a misdemeanor might 
be released on their own recognizance—but if the desire is to hold someone 
behind bars, “they could easily up it to a felony,” thus drawing concern about a 
possible increase in the number of felony charges.496 On April 13, 2019, pursu-
ant to Joint Standing Rule No. 14.3.1, no further action was allowed on this 
bill.497 
iv. AB 325 
“Bail means jail, if you’re poor. [But for the rich], clout means you’re out!”498 
On March 21, 2018, the Assembly Judiciary Committee heard Assembly 
Bill 325 (AB 325).499 Before the start of the session there was speculation that 
legislators sought to introduce a bill to eliminate cash bail in Nevada once and 
for all.500 AB 325 instead overhauls the state’s cash bail system to ensure that 
the assignment of bail, especially a high bail amount, is the last resort to “en-
sure reasonably the appearance of the [defendant] and the safety of the commu-
nity.”501 The twenty-eight-page bill, as presented, is modeled after New Jer-
sey’s set of bail reforms implemented in 2016.502 Notably, the bill “throws out” 
the majority of the state’s laws regarding bail and “require[s] courts to release 
nearly all individuals awaiting trial eligible for bail under the ‘least restrictive 
conditions’ necessary for the person to show back up to court and ensure the 
                                                        
494  Assemb. B. 203, 2019 Leg., 80th Legis. Sess. (Nev. 2019).  
495  Brian Bahouth, Nevada Could Largely Scrap Money Bail System, Activists Hopeful, 
NEV. CAP. NEWS (Mar. 18, 2019), https://nevadacapitalnews.org/2019/03/18/nevada-could-
scrap-money-bail-system-activists-hopeful/ [https://perma.cc/UU28-8BLE]. 
496  Id.  
497  Assemb. B. 325: Overview, 2019 Leg., 80th Legis. Sess. (Nev. 2019), 
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/80th2019/Bill/6318/Overview 
[https://perma.cc/LVD9-E3TC].  
498  Hearing on Assemb. B. 325 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 2019 Leg., 80th 
Legis. Sess. (Nev. Mar. 21, 2019) (Testimony of Osvaldo E. Fumo, Assemb.), 
http://nvleg.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=11281 [https://perma.cc/R8ZH-V2N2].  
499  Colton Lochhead, Cash Bail Debate Roils Carson City Hearing Thursday, LAS VEGAS 
REV. J. (Mar. 21, 2019, 5:22 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/politics-and-
government/2019-legislature/cash-bail-debate-roils-carson-city-hearing-thursday-1623589/ 
[https://perma.cc/5M4K-XQ3J]. 
500  Id. 
501  Id.; Assemb. B. 325, 2019 Leg., 80th Legis. Sess. (Nev. 2019). 
502  Lochhead, supra note 499; see also Discussion supra II.B.iii.  
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safety of the community.”503 Moreover, the bill mandates the “release prior to 
trial or before an initial court appearance” of a defendant arrested and charged 
for a misdemeanor or lower offense, unless the defendant’s underlying charge 
is for domestic violence or a restraining order violation.504  
The bill has drawn support from county “public defenders, the Americans 
Civil Liberties Union of Nevada, the Culinary Union, the Mass Liberation Pro-
ject as well as Americans for Prosperity.”505 Opposition to the bill comes pri-
marily from law enforcement, county district attorneys, and bail bondsmen.506 
For Carson City District Attorney Jason Woodbury, the opposition is not about 
the idea of reform, rather it is directed at the “requirement that a pretrial release 
hearing be held within 48 hours of a defendant’s initial appearance in court and 
. . . [the] worry that victims’ rights are not addressed in the language” of the 
bill.507 
Critics of the proposed legislation, including the Nevada District Attor-
ney’s Association, voiced several concerns including the debilitating effect its 
enactment, if passed as presented, would have on a judge’s discretionary pow-
er: “A judge is going to be in the position to have the most information about 
the specific case and about the individual accused at the earliest possible time. 
But in order to do the best job he or she can the judge needs discretion.”508 
Moreover, several district attorneys from across the state went on to highlight 
areas of the bill that would limit judicial discretion such as: the mandatory re-
lease of anyone charged with a misdemeanor without bail; inability of judges to 
create individualized conditions for a defendant’s release; and conflicts be-
tween AB 325’s release timeline and the recently passed Marsy’s law.509 Dis-
trict attorneys emphasized their willingness to work on bail reform in Nevada, 
but stressed the need for judges to be able to act.510 When questioned on how 
district attorney’s would be willing to help, Carson City’s District Attorney Ja-
son Woodbury spoke on developing objective, data driven risk assessments to 
give judges a tool to determine whether a defendant is likely to flee or be a 
danger to the community.511 On April 12, 2019, Senate Majority Leader Nicole 
                                                        
503  Riley Snyder et al., 2-Minute Preview: 14-Year-Old Drivers, Major Bail Changes on 
Deck at Legislature, NEV. INDEP. (Mar. 21, 2019, 2:10 AM), 
https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/2-minute-preview-14-year-old-drivers-major-bail-
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504  Id.  
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508  Hearing on Assemb. B. 325, supra note 498 (Testimony of Jason Woodbury, District At-
torney, Carson City.). 
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Cannizzaro and Speaker of the Assembly Jason Frierson granted the waiver re-
quested by the Assembly Committee on Judiciary.512 
At the time of this article’s publication, the Nevada Legislature continued 
to deliberate and work on these bills, which propose notable changes to im-
prove the state’s pretrial process and seek to help maintain the presumption of 
innocence. However, the opposition remained focused on whether these chang-
es would make situations worse for the defendant or harder on the judiciary to 
do its job. However, the legislative branch has not been the only branch of gov-
ernment seeking to improve Nevada’s pretrial decision-making process. 
b. Judicial Bail Reform Proposal 
On December 28, 2018, Associate Justice James Hardesty filed a petition, 
based on the recommendation of the Committee to Study Evidence-Based Pre-
trial Release to adopt a “statewide requirement that all judges in Nevada utilize 
a validated risk assessment tool for use in pretrial decision-making.”513 On Feb-
ruary 5, 2019, the Nevada Supreme Court heard public comment on the pro-
posal which, like AB 17, 125, and 206, looks to overhaul the bail system in the 
state.514 Proponents of the risk assessment “tool argued that the ‘scoring items’ 
it uses to determine whether or not a defendant is a flight risk are based on sci-
ence and that an overhaul of Nevada’s current system [is] long overdue.”515 On 
the other hand, opponents “argued that some of the scoring items [stand] to dis-
proportionately affect people of color and the poor.”516 
Notable opposition came from the American Bail Coalition (ABC), an or-
ganization whose proffered mission is “protecting the Constitutional right to 
bail and the promotion, protection and advancement of the surety bail profes-
sion in the United States.”517 The organization presented various points of op-
position, including that: 
                                                        
512  ASSEMB. DAILY JOURNAL 2019 LEG., 80TH LEGIS. SESS. 3 (Nev. Apr. 15, 2019), 
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/80th2019/Journal/Assembly/Final/aj071.pdf 
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(No. 18-910736); Abcadmin, Nevada Supreme Court Proposes Statewide Use of Pretrial 
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[1] [T]he Nevada Judiciary should not be in the business of approving a particu-
lar risk assessment algorithm or tool or requiring that judges use a particular tool 
. . . [because it] creates an impermissible appearance of impropriety, calling into 
question the objectivity of the Court. 
. . . 
[2] [O]ne-hundred ten national civil rights groups have called for an end to the 
use of pretrial risk assessments in the United States of American primarily due 
to concerns of racial bias and lack of transparency. 
. . . 
[3] [The] risk assessment under consideration relies heavily on demographic fac-
tors, such as employment, residential stability and age[,] . . . factors [that] could 
have the exact opposite impact as intended.  
. . . 
[4] [The] risk assessment relies more heavily on un-convicted conduct than [oth-
ers]. 
. . . 
[5] [T]hese tools don’t work and have been shown to increase failures to appear 
in court as required, increase crimes while on bail, and have virtually no impact 
on the reduction of the pretrial population (and in some cases dramatically in-
creasing the pretrial population). 
. . . 
[6] [A]t least one scholar blames the generational increases in mass incarceration 
on the use of risk assessment tools and labeling people as dangerous which has 
occurred and exploded in America’s penal system since 1970. 
. . . 
[7] [T]he tool . . . violate[s] the due process clause.518 
Essentially, ABC’s assertion is that in implementing the risk assessment as 
proposed, one that relies on demographic factors and unconvicted conduct and 
has not been tested for “protected-class” bias, the Court is ignoring evidence 
that the tool may disparately affect similarly situated people.519  
On March 21, 2019, the Supreme Court of Nevada issued an Order Adopt-
ing Statewide Use of the Nevada Pretrial Assessment.520 In its Order, the Court 
declared that it considered the concerns expressed by opponents of pretrial risk 
assessments about the “potential racial bias implicit in the risk assessment 
tool.”521 The Court sought a response from Dr. James Austin with the JFA In-
stitute, who acknowledged “that there is no current evidence that the tool, 
which is based on non-racial factors, increases racial disparities in pretrial re-
lease decisions.”522 Accordingly, the Court determined that implementation of 
the NPR across Nevada’s counties is necessary.523 
                                                        
518  Abcadmin, supra note 513.  
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520  Order Adopting Statewide Use of the Nevada Pretrial Risk Assessment, In re The Com-
mittee to Study Evidence-Based Pretrial Release, (Nev. 2019) (No. ADKT 0539).  
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS  
As discussed, Nevada has slowly taken steps toward the implementation of 
significant pretrial reform. Though past legislative efforts have fallen short of 
effectuating change and there remains a significant amount of opposition tar-
geted toward judicial reform efforts, Nevada has set itself up for a great oppor-
tunity to improve bail setting practices in its various jurisdictions and across the 
state. It can do so by taking actionable steps through focusing and breaking 
down reform efforts into actions for immediate and future implementation. Fur-
ther, Nevada can address the different needs of its varying jurisdictions by al-
lowing for flexibility based on a county’s population or specific needs.  
Currently, Nevada’s pretrial justice system significantly limits a defend-
ant’s access to justice by requiring a defendant to pay non-refundable fees or 
post bail, forcing them to decide between freedom or hiring an attorney.524 
Moreover, the system invites overcrowding of the jails and adversely impacts 
the resolution of the defendant’s criminal case because those that are detained 
prior to trial are more likely to be convicted.525 Pretrial detention also increases 
the likelihood that the accused will plead guilty, negatively affects the ac-
cused’s personal life, and directly correlates to the likelihood that the accused 
will commit another crime.526 Further, there are concerns regarding the practic-
es of the commercial bail bond industry including there being no obligation to 
provide bond to the presumably innocent, resulting in the denial of services to 
an indigent defendant and the high likelihood for bondsmen and bounty hunters 
to abuse the system through illegal behavior.527 Additionally, bondsmen’s prac-
tices are subjective because they can choose to not post bail for a defendant for 
any reason.528 Lastly, the bail system implicates constitutional issues such as 
due process and equal protection clause.529 
While national incarceration rates fall, Nevada instead finds itself in a dis-
appointing position as its carceral state continues its’ steady and alarming 
growth. Now, more than ever, the Silver State needs to enact real and practical 
solutions to curb detention and facilitate alternative pretrial options. Nevada 
can overcome “bail means jail” issues by protecting a defendant’s liberty inter-
est and ensuring public safety, while also allowing for the equitable and fair 
administration of justice and lower incarceration rates. The following recom-
mendations are practical steps broken down into three phases that Nevada can 
take to curb deficiencies in its current bail practices, establish best practice pro-
                                                        
524  Miller, supra note 412, at 1248–49. 
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526  Id. at 1250. 
527  Id. at 1251–52. 
528  SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 108, at 15.  
529  Wendy R. Calaway & Jennifer M. Kinsley, Rethinking Bail Reform, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 
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cedures to create a fairer system, and generate options for future creation and 
implementation of an exemplary pretrial system.  
Phase One refines Nevada’s current bail practices by eliminating bail 
schedules, creating an inter-judiciary dialogue about the purpose and perils of 
bail, and creating alternative bond opportunities for indigent defendants. This 
phase is ready for immediate implementation with minimal disruption to cur-
rent practices used in throughout the state. This first phase provides immediate, 
equitable opportunities to defendants, regardless of their economic situation or 
race. 
Phase Two establishes a more objective based pretrial practice by imple-
menting the use of an evidence based pretrial risk assessment in conjunction 
with a pretrial options matrix. The goal of this hybrid tool is to reduce the num-
ber of incarcerated people, while eliminating factors that break down solely on 
socioeconomic status. Effectuating this standard across Nevada’s counties and 
municipalities creates a means by which to fight systematic injustices and allow 
a defendant to prepare for trial with the least restrictive pretrial measures in 
place. 
Phase Three creates an option whereby Nevada counties with larger popu-
lations may move entirely away from a cash bail system and into a more inte-
grated model of pretrial release and supervision. To accomplish this, counties 
with a population of more than 100,000 would implement a dedicated pretrial 
agency to provide important bail setting services to defendants during the pre-
trial period. These agencies would allow a defendant access to a third party 
dedicated to helping them navigate their pretrial options while providing rec-
ommendations for the court to consider in any pretrial court appearances. These 
agencies would primarily focus on developing the least restrictive means to en-
sure the defendant’s subsequent court appearances and public safety. Moreover, 
agencies would administer an objective, evidence-based pretrial screening, and 
conduct one-on-one interviews to determine a defendant’s risk for failure to 
appear or potential to commit new criminal acts. Additionally, agencies would 
provide the tools necessary to implement the decision matrix by monitoring de-
fendants before trial, ensuring defendants make court appearances, and provid-
ing tools for defendants to get help prior to trial. 
A. Phase One: Immediate Refinement of Current Bail Practices in Nevada  
An immediate step for reform does not require an elimination of Nevada’s 
current bail setting practices; rather, the first step requires that the state’s cash 
bail system does what it is intended to do—ensure the appearance of defendants 
while protecting public safety. By requiring the current bail system to ensure 
defendants can prepare for trial with the presumption of innocence intact in the 
least restrictive means necessary, the state’s bail system can promptly produce 
fair and more equitable outcomes for defendants. 
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An analysis of those most grossly affected by the negative aspects of bail—
those who are in pretrial detention simply because of an inability to pay—
reveal several possible improvements which will move current bail practices 
from a simple “price for freedom” system to individualized measures that seek 
to ensure a defendant’s court appearance and promote public safety. These 
measures include determining a defendant’s ability to pay for a bond, providing 
individualized bail determinations, and creating an option for defendants who 
cannot obtain a commercial bond.530 The court’s consideration of such 
measures should include mandating the least restrictive means for pretrial re-
lease.  
1. Elimination: Bail Schedules 
The purpose of cash bail is to incentivize a defendant to return to court as 
required.531 However, tools such as blanket bail schedules used in some Nevada 
jurisdictions do not allow the current system to routinely impose the least re-
strictive means imposed on a defendant. As discussed, bail schedules dispro-
portionately affect indigent defendants because judges are free to set arbitrary 
bail amounts, while failing to consider how much money incentivizes a defend-
ant to return to court, or even if the defendant can afford to pay.532 By limiting 
a presumed innocent defendant’s options based on their monetary circumstanc-
es, bail schedules go beyond an incentive to return to court and are instead a 
restriction on a defendant’s constitutionally protected liberty interest. The au-
thors therefore recommend that jurisdictions in Nevada eliminate their use of 
bail schedules and instead use individual bail determinations based on a de-
fendant’s ability to pay. 
By eliminating bail schedules entirely, the courts would focus on the true 
purpose of bail—a security that the defendant will return to make their court 
appearance. Harvard Law School Criminal Justice Policy Program (CJPP) iden-
tified several factors that safeguard a defendant when determining their ability 
to pay bail: 
(1) [N]otice to the defendant that his “ability to pay” is a critical issue in the 
contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form (or the equivalent) to elicit relevant 
financial information; (3) an opportunity at the hearing for the defendant to re-
spond to statements and questions about his financial status, (e.g., those trig-
gered by his responses on the form); and (4) an express finding by the court that 
the defendant has the ability to pay.533 
These safeguards ensure a defendant is not held in jail because of their ina-
bility to pay.534 The first safeguard allows the defendant to understand that their 
                                                        
530  MOVING BEYOND MONEY, supra note 10, at 10. 
531  Id. at 8. 
532  See discussion supra Section III.A.  
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ability to pay may be a factor in determining the amount of bail.535 The use of a 
standardized form allows the court to assess the defendant’s income, financial 
obligations, or other financial information to assist the court in a fair determina-
tion of the defendant’s bail.536 By giving defendants an opportunity to answer 
questions about their responses in a hearing, the court can ensure that the re-
sponses in the form are fully explained.537 Further, by making express findings 
on a defendant’s ability to pay, the court can ensure that the responses are well-
reasoned, thus giving the defendant’s bail price a fully individualized consider-
ation.538 
The CJPP identified some suggestions for determining an individual’s abil-
ity to pay when setting bail. The financial factors a court could use to determine 
whether a defendant can pay bail may also be collected during the court’s de-
termining indigency as it relates to the assignment of government counsel.539 A 
presumption of the inability to pay may be necessarily triggered if the defend-
ant falls within a certain threshold already determined by the court for the pur-
pose of representation.540 The court’s assurance that a defendant can pay their 
bail fulfills the purpose of ensuring a defendant is actually incentivized to ap-
pear in court.541 Nevada courts can look to the CJPP’s identified factors to de-
termine what level of bail would be the least restrictive, not only for indigent 
defendants, but for all.542 The American Bar Association provided a similar 
standard: 
Financial conditions should be the result of an individualized decision taking in-
to account the special circumstances of each defendant, the defendant’s ability to 
meet the financial conditions and the defendant’s flight risk, and should never be 
set by reference to a predetermined schedule of amounts fixed according to the 
nature of the charge.543 
The CJJP factors included the use of a standardized form to find relevant 
financial information.544 By developing better forms to acquire relevant finan-
cial information, Nevada may also improve pretrial outcomes in other ways. 
For example, one study conducted in New York found that by redesigning 
criminal summons forms to feature a clear title, the date and location at the top 
of a form where it is more likely to be read, as well as a clear description of the 
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consequences of a failure to appear, court appearance rates improved by 13 
percent over the use of older forms cluttered with information at the bottom.545 
By replacing bail schedules with individualized determinations of bail, the 
court can ensure that Nevadans are not held in jail merely because of an inabil-
ity to pay. Individualized bail determinations allow the court to determine what 
amount of bail, if any, is needed to incentivize a defendant to return for their 
court appearance. Further, by making individualized decisions, the court can 
continue to use bail in situations where it would function as the least restrictive 
means necessary to ensure a court appearance. Individualized bail determina-
tions would also allow for stakeholders in the judicial system to engage in a 
meaningful dialogue about the purpose of bail and the potential pitfalls of its 
misapplication.  
2. Inter-judiciary Cooperation 
With the elimination of bail schedules, pretrial decisions would be based 
on judicial discretion and statutory guidance. However, as illustrated above, 
this “gut instinct” can lead to discrimination and injustice through implicit bias 
and institutional barriers that affect poor and minority defendants. As such, 
stakeholders in our justice system should engage in a meaningful dialogue that 
focuses on the purpose of bail setting practices and the potential pitfalls of mis-
applied and inappropriate bail. This dialogue would be in the best interest of 
those involved in the pretrial process who seek to make a concerted effort of 
establishing fair and just pretrial practices. By creating a dialogue between 
prosecutors, public defenders, and judges about the purpose and nature of bail 
decisions, all parties can better understand that they are seeking to preserve the 
presumption of innocence, ensure court appearances, and protect the public. By 
taking these steps Nevada can begin to move towards using bail in only the 
most necessary of circumstances and develop other options to allow indigent 
defendants the same opportunity as defendants with greater financial resources. 
To do this, Nevada should look to the example of inter-judiciary coopera-
tion currently displayed in jurisdictions like Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Wash-
ington D.C. By refocusing on the purpose of bail, judicial stakeholders can ad-
vocate for more just decisions, account for public safety, and ensure that 
defendants make their court appearances through the least restrictive means. By 
starting from the position that pretrial decisions can lead to a defendant’s loss 
of livelihood or housing because of their inability to pay bail, opposing sides in 
pretrial decisions may be more likely to reach a cooperative solution that best 
serves the demands of justice and provides greater social value.546 
                                                        
545  See USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE OUTCOMES, supra note 
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546  Robert Veldman, Note, Pretrial Detention in Kentucky: An Analysis of the Impact of 
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One concrete example of how inter-judiciary cooperation can have a tre-
mendous effect on bail practices and the lives of defendants is demonstrated in 
UCLA Law’s work in Compton, California.547 The work being done by stu-
dents there illustrates how developing the full picture of a client’s situation can 
have a drastic effect on a judge’s bail decision.548 By openly dialoguing about 
the perils of inappropriate bail, students were able to advocate for concrete re-
sults.549 By working with the client’s families and community supporters, they 
were able to show judges the whole picture and obtain their clients’ release on 
their own recognizance.550 These clients were then able to return to their fami-
lies, keep their jobs, and some were even able to enter drug-treatment facili-
ties.551 
By shifting the focus away from a set price for freedom to one of purpose-
ful pretrial decision making, defendants will have equal access to public de-
fenders, prosecutors, and judges—who can then make people-driven decisions. 
Stakeholders should engage in meaningful discussion about pretrial decisions 
and the potential repercussions they might have on a defendant’s life. An open 
dialogue about bail decisions would also allow stakeholders to address those 
who have bail amounts too low for a commercial bond, yet still too expensive 
for a defendant to afford. 
The current commercial bail bond industry creates a gap between defend-
ants who can afford to pay for the commercial fee and those whose bail is so 
low that commercial bonds are not viable. A solution to this problem is to cre-
ate the opportunity for unsecured or percentage-based bonds for indigent de-
fendants. The authors therefore recommend that Nevada courts look into im-
plementing the use of percentage-based or unsecured bonds for indigent 
defendants who would not be able to secure a commercial bail bond and ac-
cordingly be detained. 
As previously mentioned, an unsecured bond is an amount a defendant 
would have to pay only if they fail to appear in court. A percentage bond, on 
the other hand, requires a defendant to pay a percentage of the total bond di-
rectly to the court, instead of a commercial bondsman. By looking to states like 
Illinois’s and Kentucky’s use of percentage-based or unsecured bonds, the 
court could create a bridge between those who are too poor to afford a bail 
bond and the more affluent defendants who can afford bail. In Illinois, only 8.2 
percent of defendants released on percentage and unsecured bonds had their 
bonds revoked.552 
                                                        
547  Change in Compton, supra note 237; see also discussion supra Section III.B.i.  
548  Id. 
549  Id.  
550  Id. 
551  Id. 
552  See discussion supra Section III.B.iv. It is also important to consider that while 33 per-
cent of those revocations were for committing a new crime and 39 percent were for a failure 
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Moreover, by creating a space for the indigent to obtain either an unse-
cured or percentage bond, Nevada would avoid pressure from commercial bail 
bond industries. California faced significant pushback from the commercial 
bonds industry when it passed SB 10.553 The American Bail Coalition spon-
sored a committee called “Californians Against the Reckless Bail Scheme.”554 
This committee opposed the bill stating that it would cost tax payers millions 
by endangering public safety, eliminating the service provided by bondsmen, 
and further discriminating against the “poor and people of color.”555 By creat-
ing an adjacent space to the current bail industry, Nevada could avoid facing 
opposition from the bond industry while creating the opportunity for those left 
out by the bail industry to secure pretrial release. 
If individual bail determinations are made and stakeholders can advocate 
for the least restrictive means, an unsecured bond for indigent defendants might 
be viable. This policy change should be driven by inter-judiciary cooperation. 
Those involved in the pretrial process should communicate what percentage or 
unsecured amount would be necessary to provide the proper incentive for court 
appearance by a defendant.556 Further, by using a percentage bond, defendants 
would pay an affordable price directly to the court and thus be more likely to 
return for a court appearance so that they can retrieve their money. This system 
would work better than AB 203’s proposal to release defendants arrested for a 
misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor on an unsecured bond without going be-
fore a magistrate, because the bill as proposed would require a set bail schedule 
to continue and fail to consider an individual’s ability to pay. 
The diverse make up of Nevada’s counties may not mean that a statewide 
percentage or unsecured bond system would work best in every county. Indi-
vidual jurisdictions should have the freedom to implement whichever system, 
unsecured or percentage based, works best, or even both if they determine that 
is necessary. 
                                                                                                                                
to appear, the remaining 29 percent were revoked for violating a rule in relation to their court 
bond. Id.  
553  BREAKING: Nearly 600,000 Signatures Submitted by Coalition to Overturn California 




554  NO ON SB 10, https://www.stopsb10.org/ [https://perma.cc/4LEP-67BM] (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2019). 
555  We Have the Power to Stop SB 10, CALIFORNIANS AGAINST THE RECKLESS BAIL SCHEME, 
https://uploads-
ssl.webflow.com/5b918d6ef662377edb905c86/5b9e84ea0899a46c8b808fc8_Fact%20Sheet.
pdf [https://perma.cc/2T4Y-ZJ3L] (last visited May 5, 2019). 
556  Illinois, Kentucky, Wisconsin, and Oregon all prohibit the use of bail bond agents, and 
have 10 percent of the bond payable to the court, and fully refundable on appearance. Will 
Kenton, Bail Bond, INVESTOPEDIA (last updated Apr. 16, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bail-bond.asp [https://perma.cc/95S5-9P9V]. 
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With the above-mentioned actions, Phase One can focus Nevada’s current 
bail practices on the least restrictive means necessary to ensure a defendant’s 
court appearance. By shifting the focus to what can a defendant pay instead of a 
set price on freedom, fewer defendants will find themselves in jail merely be-
cause they are unable to post bail. Further, if a judge does feel a financial con-
straint is necessary, the court can create a system that would not require an in-
digent defendant to go to a commercial third party. 
B. Phase Two: Implementation of Statewide Reforms to Current Pretrial 
Practices 
The current use of judicial discretion and “gut instinct” increases the possi-
bility for significant civil liberties violations of indigent defendants and people 
of color.557 Inherent bias against minorities and the poor allow subjective opin-
ions to become the basis of pretrial decisions.558 Nevada is best served by in-
vesting time and money into developing longer term solutions for pretrial prac-
tices that develop objective standards by which pretrial decisions can be made. 
These solutions should include the development of a pretrial risk assessment 
that accounts for the specific factors pretrial conditions are meant to prevent, 
like failure to appear or commission of a new criminal act, and a correlated ma-
trix that provides for the least restrictive means of pretrial release. To reinforce 
the use of a risk assessment tool in conjunction with a decision-making matrix, 
implementing jurisdictions should require training for stakeholders. This train-
ing would help account for the “human element” and inherent bias. 
This reform phase additionally calls for an algorithmic based risk assess-
ment tool like the one suggested and being tested in four jurisdictions by the 
Supreme Court of Nevada’s Committee to Study Evidence-Based Pretrial Re-
lease. The proposed algorithmic tool could build on the foundation established 
by the implementation of the Supreme Court of Nevada Committee’s risk as-
sessment tool. Further, this algorithmic risk assessment tool should be coupled 
with a personal interview process. By merging a scientifically-based algorith-
mic system with an interview-based model, pretrial services can create individ-
ualized pretrial plans that accounts for a defendant’s risk to the community, en-
sures his appearance in court, and considers the burden that pretrial conditions 
would place on a presumptively innocent person. 
The most recent version of the NPR contained adjustments to the original 
nine factors.559 These adjustments included changing accounting for arrests to 
accounting only for actual convictions, lowering the value of the unemploy-
ment score, lowering of the value of cellphone/landline value, and an overall 
                                                        
557  See discussion supra Sections II.B.iii, V.A.ii.  
558  See generally Matthew Clair & Alix S. Winter, How Judges Think About Racial Dispari-
ties: Situational Decision-Making in the Criminal Justice System, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 332 
(2016).  
559  AUSTIN & ALLEN, supra note 5, at 5–6. 
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rescaling of the risk level.560 Importantly, these adjustments illustrated the judi-
ciary’s willingness to test the correlation of different NPR factors and their pre-
dictive accuracy with whether a defendant was rearrested for a new crime or 
whether a bench warrant was issued for a failure to appear.561 These adjust-
ments also revealed that the NPR was a “statistically valid pretrial risk instru-
ment that meets industry standards in terms of the factors being used and their 
overall predictive accuracy.”562 
Jurisdictions in Nevada should adopt a scaling system of pretrial measures 
like that created by the PSA. Because the PSA is designed to predict risk in 
three areas, risk of failure to appear (FTA), risk of new criminal activity 
(NCA), and risk of new violent criminal activity (NVCA), it has a developed 
scale of restrictions to match the risk in each category.563 In a recent Adminis-
trative Order, the Nevada Justice Court implemented a new methodology for 
pretrial services to use in determining pretrial release for defendants.564 The 
Order states that defendants brought in on an arrest of probable cause for a 
nonviolent misdemeanor without prior arrest should be released.565 It further 
states that where the charges are non-violent felonies and/or gross misdemean-
ors, pretrial services should administer the NPR and release the defendants if 
they are rated low on the NPR scale, or release those arrested for felony and/or 
gross misdemeanor possession if their NPR is low or moderate.566 The Order 
goes on to establish a list of conditions that indicate a defendant shall not be 
permitted release that include failure to appear, risk of new violent criminal ac-
tivity (NVCA), and new criminal activity (NCA) factors.567 
While the court’s order is a step in the right direction to establish a method 
of least restrictive pretrial release, it may be an overcorrection. Under the Or-
der, the options for pretrial decision break down to “release” or “shall not re-
lease,” without providing other options or conditions for release. Simplifying 
the complex problems that developed within bail reform to release or shall not 
release, actually creates a higher potential for defendants to slip through on ei-
ther side. This system additionally affects those who would be better served by 
some method of conditional pretrial release and those who should have been 
placed in pretrial detention. By developing a scale with more than two levels, 
pretrial services in Nevada would be able to develop more pretrial options that 
serve both the rights of individuals charged and the demands of justice. This 
                                                        
560  Committee to Study Evidence-Based Pretrial Release, supra note 454. 
561  AUSTIN & ALLEN, supra note 5, at 6. 
562  Id.  
563  NEW JERSEY PRETRIAL JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 15, at 7. 
564  Third Amended Administrative Order, In re Guidelines for Administrative Own Recog-
nizance Releases for the Las Vegas Justice Court, at 2 (Las Vegas Just. Ct. 2019) (No. 18-
04). 
565  Id. 
566  Id. 
567  Id. These reasons include a person arrested for a category A felony, crimes relating to 
fleeing or escape, violent actions against others, and sex-offender violations or sex crimes.  
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scale could be used in conjunction with other data driven tools to allow judges 
to make informed decisions about what pretrial conditions would be the least 
restrictive means of ensuring a defendant returns for their court appearance.  
1. Develop an Options Matrix to be Used in Conjunction with Pretrial 
Risk Assessment 
As illustrated, New Jersey’s use of the PSA combined with the Decision 
Making Framework (DMF) allows for a more individualized plan that allows 
the defendant to be released on the least restrictive means, while using modern 
resources to provide the most likely incentive for the defendant to appear and 
ensure public safety.568 As jurisdictions across Nevada seek to implement evi-
dence-based risk assessment tools, these tools should be used within the context 
of the purpose of bail and jurisdictions should understand the valuations of the 
assessment. If a defendant is low in terms of failure to appear (FTA), but mod-
erate in terms of a risk for new criminal activity (NCA) level, it would likely be 
appropriate to devise some method of supervision during release to ensure no 
criminal activity occurs. Further, if a defendant is ranked high solely in the 
FTA category, electronic supervision may be enough to ensure appearance in 
court while not disrupting the defendant’s life before trial. 
The more options pretrial services have beyond a simple “release” or “de-
tain” will allow them to customize circumstances for the best of the individual 
and the community. Use of a correlated decision-making matrix, like imple-
menting personalized bail decisions, would allow for a more equitable outcome 
before the court. When individuals are treated in this manner, they are no long-
er held back by inherent bias against their race or systematic injustice because 
of their socioeconomic status. A tailored pretrial plan would allow the system 
to better protect the presumption of innocence by allowing defendants the best 
opportunity to prepare for trial while maintaining order in their lives. 
However, AB 325 likely goes too far in creating a statewide reform so 
quickly. As seen by the example of New Jersey’s reforms, the implementation 
of the PSA can be a costly affair that may not be cost efficient for all jurisdic-
tions. While AB 325 emphasizes cash bail as a last resort for least restrictive 
means, it seeks to establish more equitable pretrial solutions. The bill also cre-
ates potential danger of forcing the practice on jurisdictions that may not be 
prepared. Moreover, the implementation of the bill may result in longer pretrial 
detention times in jurisdictions that have already made positive strides in pre-
trial reform, the taking away of judicial discretion, and conflicting with existing 
laws, such as the recently enacted Marsy’s law.569 A better solution would be a 
potential roll out plan, with state support for the new systems.  
To account for these pitfalls between human objectives and algorithmic as-
sessment, the algorithmic system can be merged with an interview system like 
                                                        
568  See discussion supra Section II.B.iii.  
569  Testimony of Jason Woodbury, supra note 508.  
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that used in Washington D.C. By conducting an in-person interview of the de-
fendant, the subjective goals of a person can be merged with the objective goals 
of an algorithm. A trained pretrial service representative could develop the in-
formation within the factors of the risk assessment algorithm, allowing the de-
fendant to have the best of both worlds. A system combining both objective 
risk assessments with interviews would allow judges to make discretionary de-
cisions for defendants who may have extenuating circumstances or who are be-
ing charged with a crime that the judge feels does not warrant the restrictions 
suggested by the algorithm. 
As stated above, critics of risk assessments state that the tools themselves 
are drawn from unreliable data that may have bias already baked into the num-
bers. An important counter to this inherent bias is diligent training on what the 
risk assessment is meant to predict and what the numbers really mean. By train-
ing users of risk assessments on what the tools’ outcomes mean, judges will be 
better able to understand that the test is accurately aligning with their own ex-
perience. Further, by using the results of risk assessments to refine what test 
factors are indicative of a defendant’s failure to appear and new criminal activi-
ty, administrators of the tool can evaluate what bias may still be in the system. 
This type of evaluation can be used to help further eliminate biased factors and 
refine the results of the tool. 
It is additionally important that jurisdiction across Nevada consider bias 
training for those who are involved in the pretrial decision-making process. Bi-
as training can also allow for discretionary decision makers to understand their 
own inherent bias and help them better evaluate their own decisions and coun-
teract whatever biases they may have. These bias trainings could include self-
tests of social cognition, like Project Implicit, which allows people to see what 
hidden biases they may have.570 By creating an atmosphere of understanding 
and education, advocates and judges involved in pretrial decisions will create a 
system that provides for public safety without creating a taxing social cost.  
Nevada should remain cautious in the amount of discretion given to judges 
in determining pretrial release and bail options. While organizations like the 
ACLU and Human Rights Watch initially supported California’s SB 10 in its 
elimination of cash bail, the groups eventually opposed the law because they 
feared it gave judges too much power and would lead to more people behind 
bars.571 Critics feared that by giving judges “absolute power” in a state where 
judges are elected officials, judges might be tempted to “pander to law-and-
                                                        
570  See generally PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/aboutus.html 
[https://perma.cc/36CA-HJZ5] (last visited Apr. 22, 2019). Project Implicit is a non-profit 
organization that administers a free Implicit Association Test that measures attitudes people 
may be unwilling or unable to self-report. Id.  
571  Jazmine Ulloa, California’s Historic Overhaul of Cash Bail is Now on Hold, Pending a 
2020 Referendum, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2019, 7:25 PM), 
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-bail-overhaul-referendum-20190116-story.html 
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order voters” by favoring detention to release.572 A counter to this critique 
would be an emphasis that judges consider public safety first, but do so in bal-
ance with the needs of defendants and their individual circumstances.573 Fur-
ther, in using their discretion to override a pretrial risk assessment and its pro-
posed conditions regarding pretrial release or detention, judges should be sure 
to focus on specific risks associated with individual defendants, and not “statis-
tical probabilities or vague generalities.”574 The requirement for a specific ex-
planation in writing of why a judge diverted from the recommendation could 
also be used to counter potential critics of judicial discretion.575 This would ul-
timately allow the judge to have the discretion necessary to make individual-
ized decisions, while maintain a “check” on this discretion. 
2. System Accountability 
While these implementations will likely help separate the gap in justice be-
tween the affluent and the indigent, the only way jurisdictions will know what 
effect these changes are having on the system is to monitor and reevaluate. 
With periodic audits and evaluations of pretrial decision-making processes, 
stakeholders will better understand what is having a positive impact on the sys-
tem and what causes deficiencies. The authors therefore recommend that with 
the implementation of Phase Two, a set period of trial, audit, and evaluation 
should be put into place to give changes the opportunity to produce quantifiable 
results. 
Evaluation will allow pretrial risk algorithms to improve and eliminate bi-
as. Following the standstill of California’s SB 10, law makers introduced a pro-
posal to help prevent improper use and biased conclusions by requiring coun-
ties to report on their use of risk assessment tools.576 This supplementary 
legislation falls in line with recommendations given by Human Rights 
Watch.577 In their recommendations following their condemnation of SB 10’s 
potential pitfalls, Human Rights Watch recommended that state and local gov-
ernments develop uniform, systematic collection of data based on detention and 
release decisions and court outcomes to account for fairness in court decisions 
and evaluate biases like race and economic status.578 In regards to algorithmic 
                                                        
572  Abbie Vansickle, So Much for The Great California Bail Celebration, MARSHALL 
PROJECT (Aug. 30, 2018, 7:20 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/08/30/so-
much-for-the-great-california-bail-celebration [https://perma.cc/RXG9-2S3G]. 
573  “Not in it for Justice”: How California’s Pretrial Detention and Bail System Unfairly 
Punishes Poor People, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 11, 2017), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/04/11/not-it-justice/how-californias-pretrial-detention-and-
bail-system-unfairly# [https://perma.cc/P9VM-ZCM3] (last visited Apr. 6, 2019) [hereinafter 
Not in it for Justice]. 
574  Id. 
575  NEW JERSEY PRETRIAL JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 15, at 11. 
576  Ulloa, supra note 571.  
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pretrial assessment tools, Human Rights Watch further recommends complete 
transparency with any formula or algorithm used and the underlying data used 
in risk assessments.579 Data transparency should be accompanied with some 
sort of “mechanism for public oversight” and the ability to audit the pretrial as-
sessment tool for calibration and adjustment.580 These safeguards would allow 
jurisdictions to create an evolving tool. By auditing the assessment on a yearly 
basis and re-calibrating it, a commission on public oversight can eliminate or 
add factors that move the tool away from biased decisions and can find factors 
that contribute to understanding defendants’ frequency for failure to appear, 
and the risk for new criminal activity (NCA) and new violent criminal activity 
(NVCA). 
These evaluations can be used to refine steps made to bail reform or even 
further develop algorithmic risk assessments. Evaluations could further help to 
reconcile Professor Stevenson’s stated problem of measuring an algorithm’s 
results with actual human objectives. By comparing algorithmic results with 
actual results for failure to appear (FTA) scores, risk for new criminal activity 
(NCA), and risk of new violent criminal activity (NVCA), pretrial decision-
makers will better understand the value of the factors incorporated into in risk 
assessment tool.581 In assessing the data, the evaluation could look to the quan-
titative results of implementation (number of defendants released on bail, re-
duction in jail population, etc.) and qualitative results (impressions of attorneys 
and judges, experiences of defendants, etc.). This process could lead to the de-
velopment of other factors or the elimination of factors that propagate system-
atic biases. Also, these tools could establish more capable Pretrial Agencies, 
should jurisdictions wish to implement Phase Three. 
C. Phase Three: Creation of Pretrial Agencies in Counties with Populations 
over 100,000 to Coincide with the Elimination of Cash Bail 
One problem with statewide reform in Nevada is its unique geographical 
makeup. Issues prevalent in Washoe and Clark County can be trivial in com-
parison to issues faced in more rural counties. Further, rural counties may lack 
the financial and human capital that might make widespread implementation of 
any major state reform to bail insurmountable. As such, the authors recommend 
a specific step for Phase Three based solely on population. 
Phase Three creates pretrial agencies in counties with populations of over 
100,000 people to coincide with the elimination of cash bail. These agencies 
would be an alternative to the current system by implementing the risk factor 
assessment and interview steps from Phase Two, combined with emerging 
technologies to ensure adequate pretrial supervision. These agencies could 
model themselves after D.C.’s PSA. In their self-evaluation of pretrial reform 
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and the elimination of cash bail, the state of New Jersey stated that the current 
operation of their Pretrial Services Program was facing problems with funding, 
defendant social problems, and issues with technology.582 While New Jersey 
planned to operate their pretrial service agencies solely via court fees, this 
turned out to be ultimately be unsustainable. Court staff were unable to assist 
defendants with mental health issues, housing, and/or cases of substance abuse. 
Further, the state struggled to implement reliable electronic monitoring across 
all jurisdictions in the state. Essentially, New Jersey found that a state-wide, 
one-size-fits-all solution was not feasible. 
Phase Three intends that should more population dense counties want to 
fully move away from a cash bail system, they should follow the example set 
by D.C.’s PSA. While the efforts of D.C.’s PSA are worth emulating, it is im-
portant to remember that D.C. is a metropolitan area, with relatively easy ac-
cess to defendants in an interconnected geographical area as compared to other 
large cities. D.C.’s PSA also receives funding of almost $65 million dollars a 
year.583 While the services and tools D.C.’s PSA use may be scalable to smaller 
jurisdictions, there is likely a better cost-benefit to using a dedicated pretrial 
service in jurisdictions with more available funds. 
1. A Full Service Pretrial Agency 
If counties in Nevada wish to fully eliminate cash bail, they will need to 
take the appropriate steps to ensure that a system is in place to facilitate incen-
tives for defendants to appear, monitor defendants out on release for further 
crimes, and protect the community at large from potentially violent actions. 
These agencies, like current pretrial divisions, could be dedicated to the pre-
sumption of innocence and release.584 While both Clark and Washoe County’s 
pretrial services divisions are currently focused on facilitating tighter turn 
arounds between arresting agencies and judges, these agencies might need to 
take on more if a county wishes to eliminate money bail. 
A dedicated pretrial agency could do all initial intake for arresting agen-
cies. After a person is arrested, they could be brought directly to a pretrial ser-
vice case manager who would gather information about the defendant for use in 
the pretrial risk assessment tool. The case manager could further conduct inter-
views designed to help discuss subjective topics needed during pretrial deci-
sions. Personal interview information could further be used in determining if 
the defendant is likely to need a public defender or substance abuse assistance. 
Case managers could then facilitate the use of the pretrial decision matrix 
implemented in Phase Two to create a proper recommendation for the deciding 
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judge. By taking in the factors of the defendant’s algorithmic results and per-
sonal interview, these pretrial recommendations would more fully compliment 
the defendant’s individual circumstances. For example, if a defendant lacks a 
mobile phone, that would likely count against them within an evidence-based 
risk assessment tool. However, during a personal interview, a case manager de-
termines how to best contact the defendant. A greater understanding of the de-
fendant’s circumstances would allow the case manager to make a more particu-
larized recommendation, allowing the defendant to still be released and 
contacted. 
A dedicated, full service pretrial agency is likely to help facilitate defend-
ant appearances in court. By creating a dedicated pretrial service agency like 
D.C.’s PSA, Nevada counties could facilitate a relationship between case man-
agers and defendants, like the D.C. model. Dedicated pretrial service agencies 
would allow those working through the pretrial process to have a support sys-
tem to help them appear in court at the appropriate time. D.C.’s PSA saw ap-
pearance rates of 88 percent by creating a system that uses case managers, re-
minders, and potential pretrial supervision.585 Further, with a system of 
managing and monitoring, a full-service pretrial agency would be equipped 
with the appropriate information when defendants failed to make court appear-
ances.  
Under current Nevada law, if a commercial bond agency receives notifica-
tion of a defendant’s failure to appear, they have 180 eighty days to produce the 
client or give an adequate reason for a failure to appear.586 If counties were to 
eliminate commercial bonds altogether, the county would need to facilitate the 
recovery of defendants. By creating an integrated agency, case managers would 
be able to monitor a defendant’s compliance with the conditions and/or rules of 
supervision. This would allow case managers to be more aware that a defendant 
is likely to fail to make a court appearance, and act preventatively rather than 
reactionarily to a failure to appear. Further, by being involved in supervision 
and maintaining direct contact with defendants, a pretrial agency would have 
the information about a defendant’s likely location, contacts, and/or aliases. A 
dedicated pretrial agency could monitor defendants for new criminal acts and 
facilitate tools to help defendants avoid new criminal acts. By monitoring de-
fendants and giving them the opportunity and tools to properly prepare for trial, 
a pretrial agency could help mitigate the risk that defendants out on pretrial re-
lease will commit new criminal acts. The agency can monitor via over the 
phone check-in’s, in person check-in’s, or even electronic monitoring.  
With a dedicated agency, tools could be put in place to automatically send 
text reminders to defendants informing them of their court dates and potential 
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consequences for failure to appear. These and other messages from a dedicated 
agency would help to reduce failure to appear rates and therefore also reduce 
the number of bench warrants issued.587 For example, the Las Vegas Justice 
Court’s Pretrial Service Division has implemented an automated system to send 
reminder texts for required supervision check-ins.588 A reduction in the number 
of bench warrants issued would create a reduction in the risk new criminal ac-
tivity (NCA) committed by defendants. 
It is documented that drug users are more likely than nonusers to commit 
crimes,589 which can be partially attributed to the fact that it is a crime to pos-
sess, manufacture, or use many drugs.590 One Bureau of Justice Statistics study 
in 2006 found that 17 percent of state prisoners and 18 percent of federal in-
mates committed offenses to get money for drugs.591 In 2012, the White 
House’s Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring report (ADAM II) findings showed 
that 60 percent of arrestees tested positive for some drug at the time of their ar-
rest.592 Fewer than a third of those arrested had ever been in outpatient or inpa-
tient drug or alcohol treatment.593 
As mentioned above, one of the problems faced by New Jersey’s statewide 
bail reformation was the ability for pretrial service agencies to assist with sub-
stance abuse. A dedicated pretrial service agency could partner with or even 
develop programs to help defendants with substance abuse or drug related is-
sues. By offering access to social services, a pretrial service agency would be a 
positive step towards not only developing a more equitable court system, but 
towards defendants’ rehabilitation. By giving defendants access to tools that 
might help them overcome issues with substance abuse the agencies can help 
move the defendants away from the criminal lifestyle that may have influence 
on their habits. 
A dedicated pretrial agency could develop and facilitate the use of more 
modern uses of electronic monitoring. By properly using and maintaining elec-
tronic monitoring systems, and then communicating with judges and other judi-
cial stakeholders about the benefits of electronic monitoring, case managers 
could help overcome any unfamiliarity with or doubt about electronic monitor-
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ing systems.594 One study found that many judges were unfamiliar with or only 
somewhat familiar with electronic monitoring programs.595 This study further 
stipulated that funding was a concern for electronic monitoring but that by us-
ing portions of jail budgets, overall impact on budgetary concerns would be al-
leviated and would ultimately cost less than detaining a defendant.596 
A full service agency would need to find its place in the criminal justice 
system. Human Rights Watch recommended to governments looking at bail re-
form that pretrial service departments and probation departments should be 
separate.597 This separation is to ensure that a pretrial agency is focused solely 
on helping get people to court and providing access to other services like men-
tal health counseling or voluntary drug treatment.598 But if the agency, from its 
inception, is focused on not only aiding defendants pretrial, but also monitoring 
those under conditional supervised release, jurisdictions could eliminate inter-
agency communication break downs and have a greater opportunity to ensure 
court appearance and public safety. 
While pretrial supervision is likely to help with court a defendant’s failure 
to appear and give defendants a greater opportunity for equitable treatment in 
court, there may not be a statistical link between pretrial supervision and “no 
criminal arrest.” A study in 2013 by the LJAF found defendants who were 
deemed moderate to high risk by a risk assessment tool and given supervised 
release for more than 180 days were 12 to 36 percent less likely to have an 
NCA, risk of new criminal activity, score.599 However, because some models 
showed a statistically significant relationship while others only approached sta-
tistical significance, the LJAF found these findings to be tentative.600 Super-
vised release is an important consideration when thinking of eliminating cash 
bail, given that this model was run on defendants who scored moderate to high 
risk for a new criminal activity (NCA). A dedicated pretrial service agency 
could be used to help limit the danger of new criminal acts being committed in 
the community at large. 
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2. The Problem with Statewide Reform 
While the PJI gave New Jersey’s efforts an “A”, the state acknowledged 
that it was floundering under its new policy implementation. Should Nevada 
wish to move away from cash bail and towards more equitable release stand-
ards, it must remember the issues highlighted by New Jersey and the missteps 
made by California. New Jersey took two years to implement their move away 
from bail and still came up short on funds. California’s move away from cash 
bail created a fear that more defendants will end up in pretrial detention than 
before. New Jersey and California both seemingly failed to tailor their reforms 
to the needs of individual jurisdictions. 
By using the resources and infrastructure of more urban counties, Nevada 
can use these pretrial agencies as examples of effective methods for pretrial re-
lease. A dedicated agency in higher population counties in Nevada can be used 
as a proving ground. By monitoring the results and analyzing what parts of the 
pretrial agency have the greatest effect on creating equitable outcomes, rural 
counties in Nevada can then scale down these types of services and fit them to 
their needs. For example, in counties with larger geographic areas it might be 
harder to facilitate in person check-ins. But if a larger, more populated county 
found that in person check-ins had a smaller effect on failure to appear and new 
criminal activity than automated messaging, a rural county might invest re-
sources into an automated messaging system.  
The implementation of these phases may take the form of a statute or ad-
ministrative action in individual jurisdictions. After analyzing both success and 
failures of jurisdictions outside Nevada, the authors recommend the phases of 
reform be implemented by administrative bodies in individual jurisdictions 
overseen by a central statewide body to provide guidance and resources, similar 
to pretrial reform in Illinois and Pennsylvania.601 This would allow administra-
tive bodies to rollout reform in a manner that does not inhibit or counteract cur-
rent efforts to improve the pretrial detention system, rather than forcing juris-
dictions to accommodate a one-size-fits-all approach.  
Further, a state-sponsored body will provide a ground for judges and others 
involved in pretrial services to be confident in the tools used to set bail in a 
more equitable and just manner, as well as provide a body that has the capabil-
ity and resources to evaluate, update, and improve these tools with real and 
tested data. Moreover, the State Legislature may use these to develop a plan for 
gradual implementation, to allow jurisdictions to effectively and efficiently im-
plement changes to ensure the least restrictive means are imposed in all pretrial 
decisions. Overall, the purpose of these recommendations is to develop meth-
ods to ensure the only reasons a person is detained during the pretrial process is 
if they are either a danger to the community or likely to flee. No person should 
have to spend time detained before they are convicted of a crime merely be-
cause they do not have the means to pay for their freedom. By implementing 
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these phases, jurisdictions in Nevada can move away from the problems that 
have arisen in modern bail systems, while avoiding the growing pains many 
other jurisdictions are experiencing. 
CONCLUSION 
In an everchanging social climate, archaic legal traditions must evolve to 
meet the social challenges of today. In an age of mass incarceration where the 
poor are often trapped in pretrial detention due to the inability to afford bail, 
state legislatures and judiciaries need to adapt bail proceedings to protect the 
constitutional rights of the citizenry and avoid the harms of cash bail bonds. 
Such harms can be legal and social in nature, ranging from the data-supported 
fact that pretrial detainees are more likely to plead guilty independent of their 
own culpability to the impoverished losing employment because they cannot 
financially post bail. To remedy the detriments resulting from cash bail, this ar-
ticle advocates its eventual abolishment and replacement with alternative and 
less restrictive means to achieve the same overall policy rationale. 
Recently, the United States has entered a new stage of bail reform to move 
away from a “tough on crime” stance towards a more defendant-oriented means 
of pretrial release. States have approached this goal by enacting legislation such 
as the reduction of cash bail, the use of pretrial risk assessments, and even a 
limitation as to the number of defendants who can be held in pretrial detention. 
In 2018, California passed Senate Bill 10, the California Money Bail Reform 
Act, which required judges to consider the defendant’s finances when institut-
ing bail and entertain possible noneconomic means for pretrial release. The Act 
was met with opposition as prominent organizations such as the American Civil 
Liberties Union feared expansive judicial discretion that would further promul-
gate inequalities amongst minorities and the impoverished. Nevertheless, de-
spite opposition, UCLA School of Law joined with other criminal justice advo-
cacy groups to launch a pilot program with the goal of eliminating or reducing 
bail for felons who remain incarcerated merely because they cannot financially 
afford bail. This program has reported successes such as pretrial release or in-
duction into drug rehabilitation facilities to await trial. This glimmer of hope, in 
conjunction with other reform efforts such as the establishment of Washington 
D.C.’s Pretrial Services Agency and New Jersey’s algorithmic pretrial assess-
ment, demonstrate that bail reform efforts are having positive effects even if the 
measures up to this point remain imperfect.  
Nevada, however, still suffers from high incarceration rates, incapacitating 
more people on average than other states, at a rate that is 15 percent higher than 
the national average. Such incarceration has incurred substantial costs. Since 
2012, spending in relation to high incarceration has risen 20 percent each year. 
Nevada’s cash bail system is founded upon some of the most detailed and com-
prehensive statutes in the country. While the Nevada Constitution prohibits ex-
cessive bail, judicial discretion becomes the ultimate factor in determining if an 
arrestee will receive pretrial release and if so, upon what terms that release is 
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conditioned. Many of Nevada counties employ standardized bail schedules, but 
they remain nonuniform in practice.  
Despite high incarceration and bail inconsistencies in the state, Nevada has 
been slow to enact bail reform. For this purpose, this article makes several bail 
reform recommendations to defy the harms of the cash bail system, introducing 
the reforms as phases. In Phase One, bail schedules should be eliminated to 
promote dialogue regarding current bail procedure, endorse alternative bail 
practices, and instill principles of equality. Phase Two advocates the implemen-
tation of a more objective-based pretrial practice through the use of an evi-
dence-based pretrial risk assessment within a pretrial options matrix. In doing 
so, the process will eradicate socioeconomic factors that rely upon race or class 
for bail determinations. As for Phase Three, in counties with a population of 
100,000 people or more, cash bail will be completely abandoned and replaced 
by a pretrial agency dedicated to bail setting services like that of Washington 
D.C. Such an agency would provide invaluable help to defendants to obtain re-
lease and ultimately navigate all pretrial proceedings while also considering the 
safety concerns and flight risk of allowing the defendant back into the commu-
nity. By following these Phases, the new bail process will protect Nevadans 
from the misgivings of the current cash bail system. 
